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Laird v. Tatum
Cert to CA DC: Tamm, Wilkey; dissenting: tlacKiQQQQ
This suit was filed almost two years ago by a number of
citizens and organizations connected with political causes,
primarily in opposition to the war in Somth East Asia.

The

complaint alleged that resps, the Secy of Defense, et al.,
were engaged in the surveilance of

«xxix~N«R

in peaceful political activities.

s~mex~f

civilians engaged

All of resps believed

that they had been under surveilance, and some of them knew so,
as an attached document demonstrated.

It was alleged that

this xx surve~nce and the keeping of records, including a
so-called blacklist

of persons who "might cause trouble for

-2-

the Army" was widely circulated and was stored in a computerized
data bank.

It was further alleged that the defendants planned

to mkx make the data available to

x other federal agencies.

Finally, it was alleged that the purpose and effect of all
this was the harassment and intimidation of plaintiffs in order
to deter them from exercising their 1st Amendment rights XN
of political expression,
policies.

~N

protest and dissent from government

This harassment was

XN~~NX~Nx~

invading the plaintiffs'

privacy, damaging their reputations, adversely affecting their
Rm~N

employment and their opportunities for employment.

This was said to deprive plaintiffs of their rights to free speech
XN and association the right to petition the govt for redress of
~x~

grievances, and ther right of privacy guaranteed an protected

by the 1st, 4th, 5th, and 9th Amendments.

The surveilance

program was alleged to E exceed the lawful needs of the Army
and to be without statutory authority.
of all other similarly situtated.
judgment

XRX

Plaintiffs sued on behalf

The~ought

a declarat?ry

that Army surveilance of lawful political activity

was unconstitutional; preliminary and permanent injunctions
against spying and maintaining records about the lawful political
activites of plaitiffs; a mandatory injuntion ordering the
defs to produce all records before the court so that they could
be destroyed; and a premanent injuntion forbidding plaintiffs
from xxx attaching security classification to any of these
records.
An answer was never filed

R

in the case.

Instead, defs,

~ moved
-------·
----------------------petr here,
to -dismiss
the complaint for failure to state
"----

a cause of action.

The case came before Judge Hart on ~
~ motion

-3-

as well as on the motion for a preliminary injuction.

In

connection with the latter motion, the govt put in affidavits
about the extent of surveilance of civilians by Army Intelligence,
but no testimony was taken despite the resps offer of
proof.

~~xx

Instead, Judge Hart ruled from the bench that the

information MXX that the Army was

£~m~xxxE~m~x

compiling was

readily available through the news media; that resps showed
(""\

no unconstitutional acti:n; and that they showed no threafs
to their rights.

The moftion to dismiss was granted.

Resps appealed to CA DC 'l.vhich reversed Judge Hart, Judge
MacKinnon dissenting.

The court of appeals ruled that resps

had made out a cause of action by alleging that the existence
of the surveilance machinery chilled the 1st Amendment
of resps and the members of their class.

Since

~

r~hts

resps were

alleged to be spied on, the court held that they had standing
to make the claimJ

The

£~~M

court ordered that the case be

remanded to the district court so that the court could determine
the nature of the domestic intelligence system, what part of
the system was unrelated to or not reasonably necessary to the
performance of the Army's function, and whether the

overb~d

aspects of the system have an inhibiting effect on resps.
The govt sought cert from that decision, which was granted.
Although~

other facts are thrown about in the briefs by

all sides, the only relevant facts for the purposes of this
case at this juncture are those alleged in the complaint which
must be taken as true.

Allegations about the extent of the

surveilance as a result of a recent order is not

x~i~XRRHXX

-4recognizable

or relevant at this time.

Thus, the Court must

accept as true the axRx allegations of resps that the Army has
engaged in the surveilance of civilcitans engaged in legitimate
political activity, that this surveilance is neither necessary
to xkei::x the Army's legitimate funtions nor authorized by law,
and that the effect of

th~s

16-t~

is to chill the exercise of x

Amendment rights and invade the privacy of resps.

the question

before the Court is, assuming that all those things are true,
can resps assert these rights at this time.
Petrs assert first that the claim put forth by resps is
not_justi~iaQle

n~

in the

XRRXXR

sense that the issues raised may

-

properly be considered by a court.

Justiciability is based

on the need to limit disputes to cases that are presented in
an adversary context in a way capable of resolution through
the judicial process and on the Constitutional doctrine of
seperation of powers.

Resps are said to allege only a general

invasion of privacy, {mage to their reputations, and adverse
effects on employment; they cite no specific examples.

Thus,

their claims are not concrete enough to be justiciable.
are the assertions enough to justify the

«~Nx:Kx~

Nor

courts'

intervening in the actions of the President and Congress.
There is no assertion that criminal sanctions have resulted,
that any of resps have been

«~m~x

compelled to disclose their

political beliefs or ideas, or that the collected information
has

ERRRN

been misuea--factors that have been present in other

chilling effect cases.

Even when a chilling effect is alleged,

there must be a focus on an actual effect of a program not on

xix -5a general objection to it.

If this case is justiciable, petrs

argue that the case and controversy requirement is out the
window.

Resps should rely on Congressional supervision of

this executive function, not on judicial supervision.
Resps argue that there is nothing hypothetical about
their complaint; they allege that they themselves have been

"

survei~lance x~

under

dossiers.
system
~exxx

and are the subject of records and

The system is operating ; it is not a hypothetical

~fxxxgex

or a general policy not yet put into effect.

Resps have alle ged that the Army's policy abuses the

freedoms of all Americans and that it has particular applicaton
to them.

\\7h.ile the govt argues that resps were not chilled

because they instituted this suit, it has never been the policy
of this Court in first amendment areas to find no justiciability
because somone with even a greater injury might sue.
Amendment is too important.

The F irst

So important, that special principles

have developed which enable a litigant to secure early protection
of a first amendment right without waiting until he has been
directly subjected to the force of the law.

If it is alleged

that the ~eate of the law prevents the exercise of 1st amendment
rights, than there is a judiciable controversy.

Such a chilling

effect has been noted in other case when a law required compulsory
disclosure of

xx~

associates, when the threat of a xxNxsanction

resulted in censorship, when re g istration f~x causing political
and
identifcation was required,jwhen x~g~ loyalty oaths that could
inhibit joining political groups were required,

The chilling

effect in those cases was no more conceete than the chilling

-6-

effect here.

In those cases, the plaintiffs had not be chi1~d

to the extent that they were unwilling to litigate.
justiciability was found.

Yet

Social science supports the fact

that a chilling effect results from activities such as those
alle ged in the brief,

RH~

-

but if the Court is not sure, the

correct result is to remand for the hearing to see if there
was in fact a chilling effect,

In addition, resps have alle ged that their privacy was
unjustly invaded by the actions of the Army.

There can be

no question that some of them suffered such an invasion in
the sense that they were the subjects of surveilance and dossiers.
They are entitled to a hearing on their privacy alle gations
even if the chilling effect on 1st amendment rights which
they allege is not concrete enough.
As a second argument, petrs claim that the resps had no
standing to bring this suit.

The injury that is alleged by

the named plaintiffs is not a personal inury but an injury
to others.

By

~Rxxx

resps own admission, they were not chilled

in the exercise of their 1st Amendment rights or else they
would not have brought this litigation.

While Congress may

have power to confer jurisdiction to someone to serve as a
private attorney general to

~

advance the xxxN rights of another,

it has not done so in this area.
acted, the

NRMRN~

And even if Congress had so

named plaintiffs must have something more

than a general interest held by the pulic as a whole.

If

the complaint is based on future injury, there is still not
any standing because the hypothetical possilbity is not definite
enough.

-7Resps argue that petrs never raised the issue of standing
iRxxkiKxfsxm below and that it is not properly raised for the
first time in this Court.

There must only be a logical connection

between the party who is suing and the issue he seeks to raise
for xk2ixxx there to be standing in federal court.

Such a

nexus exists here because petrs allege that they are among the
individuals and organizations who are subject to surveilance.
Moreover, resps specifically alleged that their 1st amendment
rights were being chilled and that their privacy was being
invaded.

The statement in oral argument that they were not

chilled was directed only to the bringing

s~x

of this suit.

The fact that the effect was not so great as to intimidate them
~

from bringing the suit does not mean that there is no effect

at all or that there are not some kinds of expression in which
they will not engage because of the chilling effect of surveilance.
Moreover, as individuals and organizations engaged in political
activites, their interests are involved if they cannot XKK
persuade others to join, attend meetings, or
with

~

othe~wise

associate

resps because of the chilling effect of surveilance.

If you accept the govt's position that anyone who comes forward
to challenge the constitutionality of surveilance cannot be
intimidated by it, than you have to conclude that

xk2xxx~

there can never be a suit challenging a practice on theg ground
that it chills speech unitl after a person has spoken and somehow
been punished.

But the Court has recognized on numerous occasions

that a person has standing before he is punished because fax
failure to

x~~

speak is the harm to be prevented.

Resps therefpre

have a special interest in the interest and the interest they

- 8]assert is

~xNXR

within the

by the 1st Amendment.

x~NNR

zone of interests protected

Finally , since it is alleged and must

be accepted for purposes of this case that the surveilance is
beyond the scope of official authority, standing should exist.
The Court has recognized the rule that standing is more likely
to exist when xxKNxxeixaN the action challenged is not authorized.
And kf of course, there is no question that resps have a direct
interest intheir own privacy which they allege has been abridged.
Any discussion of the concept of justiciability and
standing must begin with the Court's

N~N

opinion in

~last_y~

.Qohen, 392 U .S. 83 (1968), which upheld the standing of plaintiffs
as taxpayers to challengean act of Congress authorizing expenditures
of funds on the ground that those funds we would violate the
1st Amendment guarantee against establishment of religion.
In part III of that opinion, the Court discussed the concept
of

'~JUSt~ca
. . b.~ 1.~ty.
\

It traced two

XNNgx

roots to the doctrine.

(I)First, the doctrine limits the business of federal courts to
quest ions presented in an adversary context and in

RXXNXM

a

; "

form historically viewed as capable of resolution through the
judicial

process.~econd,

it reflects the limited role of the

courts in the federal scheme of seperation of powers.

The

Court then went on to indicate what kinds of things had been
held to be non-justiciable--a tactic probably necessitated by
the amorphus qulaity of the concept.

There is no jasticiable

question when the parties seek to litigate a political question.
The term "polictical question" was discussed more fully in
Powell v. McCormack , 395 U .S. 486 (1969), in which the Court

-9-

indicated that it meant a question committed by the Constitution
to another branch of the government to resolve.

Surely, that is

not the case here since the guestion raises issues of Speech and
Privacy
~2~Nxaxxx peculiarly committed by the Constitution to
..............
,.,.

-

judicial resolution.

-

A

~NXX~K

political question would be a

question such as KR!RNK!RX which o/¥J.d iEl.a te
be seated in the Senate, because

~icle

xaxi:xfi~&xxxbi!R

should

I , Sec 5, gives the

Senate exclusive power to make such determinations.
Secondly, no advisory opinion can be justiciable; but
clearly none is sought here.

---

No one denies that the parties

are generally antagonistic toward one another.

Certainly

resps have as great as antagonistic position to the government
as that of the taxpayers in Flast--Y!_ Cohen.

Third, the Court

will not consider moot questions, but mootness is not argu.§d
here.

Even if the case were moot, that is a factual question

which the district court would have to resolve after hearing
the evidence about the Army's new practices.aNNXaNNNXXKN
Fourth "N!RN!R where there x is no standing, there is no
question.

justiciab_l~

.

This is, I suggest, the heart of the case for the

government because all of their justiciablilty arguments are

.....

__.....

really standing arguments.
Essentially , the government 's brief relies on only two
points.

First , that the chilling effect alleged by

~

resps

was not specific enough, and second, that any injury alleged
was alleged to others, not to resps.

Those points, I think

go really to standing, as the concept was explained in Flast
and in Data Process ing Service v.

Ca~,

397 U.S. 150 (1970).

-10In Flast, the Court said that standing presented the question
of whether the plaintiff "is a proper party to request ami
11

adjudication of a particular issue
itself is justiciable."

t'·( 'to

and~

whether the issue

In this case, whether resps have alleged

a specific enough injury and whether they have alleged a personal
injury seems to me to go to their fitness to raise the issue
not to the appropriateness of the issue
In Data

Processin~~he

~f

for judicial resolution.'

Court said that the two tests for

standing NN~x wer~ether the plaintiff alleged that the challenged
action caused him

iNNx~

injury in fact

an~hether

the interest

sought to be protected by the plaintiff were arguably within the
zone ot interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or
constitutional guranty in question.
is easy for surely the

The answer to the second test
arguably
interest of speech and privacy are/within

the zone of interests protected by the 1st and 4th amendments.
The answere to the first test is all, I submit, that the govt
is really arguing about.
For the govt cannot seriously maintain that the underlyin~ "
issues in this case--free speech and privacy--are not within
the domain of the judiciary.

These are values committed by

the Constitution for judicial protection because they are
anti-majpritarian values.

A person's right to S:l!ll!l speech and

privacy is to be protected from the majoritarian instincts of
\ Congres and the President, not protected by themo
the allegations of the complaint

xais:~

to speech and privay are being invaded,
may seek judicial redress.

Thus, if

show that resps' right
:KN~axxxR~a

then they

-ll:-

~1~~

It is clear to :ma: me that the allegations are~iq~act to
g ive resps standing to raise these justiciable issues.

The

~~

complaint alleges that thjh:' 1st amendment ri ghts and rights
to privacy have been abridged.

Throug~ut its brief, the govt

ignores entirely the alle gations about privacy, and yet if
the Army is acting beyond iss authority in a way that invades
the Constitutionally protected privacy of resps, there is no
question that they are entitled to redress.

Nor can the govt

argue with respect to privacy, that the complaint is not XNXXi£ieNx
e specific enough; the ExieXxNa:xxa: complaint has attached to
it an example of Army surveilance which indicates that some
of resps have been spied on and have ERRNXXNXEX had records
made.

Unless the Court is willing to say that under no circumstances

and keeping dossiers invade the privacy of civilians, there
is a genuine issue here of whether this invasion was reasonable.
Thus, on the privacy issue alone, largely i gnored in the govt's
brief, there is standing for resps to sue.
There is also, it seems to me, standing to raise the
chilling effect claim.

That is of course a peculiar claim in

that it alleges a ne gative harm;

the resps alle ge that they

have been unable or afraid to do somethingx they are Constitutionally
entitled to do because of the actions of the government.
But the mere fact that it is a ne gative harm that is alle ged
does not mean that it is none the less genuine.

This Court

has recognized the harm before, most notably in Do~browski kx
Y...!. Pfister, 380 U.s. 479 (1965), in which the plaintiffs were

-12-

allowed to bring a §1983 action against La officials
prevent them from

~~XXR«

f~x

to

prosecuting or threatening prosecution

under a state law alleged to be overbraod and an inhibition on
political activities.

Dombrowski was not concerned with

justiciability or standing, which were assumed, but with
the abstention doctrine, as was Younger v. Harris, 401 u·zs.
37 (197l),which limited Dombrowski somewhat.
that no one denies that in a

c~se

The point is

where comity does not dictate

to the contrary--amd there is of course no comity issue here-~

allegations of a chilling effect xxRx of illegal actions

are justiciable.
The govt argues that the allegations of resps are not
specific enough.
I

\....._....

To a certain extent that is the nature of

the chilling effect doctrine; how can one be specific about
the road not x taken.

If the resps could cite actual prosecutions

ar firings or other abuses, they could serve as the basis of

a suit, but resps allege that there have been
of these because the threat of them has

}llX~N

kN~WNX~

none

inhibited the

political activity of persons subject to actual sanctions so
that no sanctions have had to be imposed.
~

the respsAsay that the

l\lNX~NXRXN

In other words,

alleged purpose and effect

of harassment and intimidation has worked.

Surely, the aleegedly

illegal acts of the Army are not subject to challenge only if
they do not work,

MNXXRXXM~XR~XRX~XXXXXRRMXXXNXMRXXNXXXXX

Secondly, the nature of the perceived threat resulting from
the Army's actions can be proven by testimony by resps who
have actually felt inhibited.

Third, I am not at all convinced

-13that it is necessary for resps to specif ically allege or prove
actual inhibition in the exercise of their 1st amendment ri ghts.
If the resps can show that they were threate~ in the exercise
of those rights by illegal Army acts,

N

surely in the

~XNE

protected area of 1st amendment rights they are entitled to
relief, re gardless of whether thee threats actually deterred
them.
the

But finally, to the extent that the govt is arguing that

ENm~XaN

xx

is

really arguing that the pleadings were insufficient, not

xeax~

that

complaint below was not specific enough, it

~

resps have no standing.

Pleadings are, of course,

liberally construed in the federal system.

I x have no doubt

that this complaintN is sufficient under a liberal construction,
but if it x is not, amendment is also liberally permittedJ
There remains the question whether resps have alleged an

l

injury personal to them.

Nex!RxcxgxiNxxR:Kx The govt's argument

seems to be based on a statement made in oral argument in the
court of appeals and mentioned in the dissenting opinion below.
The lawyer for resps said that they were not so inhibited that ; ;
they were prevented from bring ing this lawsuit.

Therefore,

the govt concludes that they suffered no personal injury.
This is obviously wrong .

The fact that they brought the suit,

banded together with others, is no iN indication that they have
not be inhibited in other areas of political expression.
Their 1st amendment rights are further affected if in attempting
to ex persuade others to their

views,the~ / find

in fact cowed by E fear of Army surveilance.

that others are
Finally, I am

not at all sure that the admission, out of context as it was,
would under any circumstances be CXN rele~ant to the construction

-14-

of the complaint which says specifically that resps were chilled
in the exercise of their 1st amendement rights.
1\:xxax~x

[ The Court has recently considered standing in a cas)
argued before you came; /
not yet come down.
/"'.

Sierra

Clu~b

Sierra Club -c. Morton, which has

In that case, the Court held that the

had no standing to challenge the govt's leasing

of Mineral King Valley to Walt Disney Enterprises for the
development of a ski resort.

The Sierra Clua alleged only

that it had a special interest in enviornmental issues and
failed to allege any
general populace.

~x

interest that seperated it from the

But in rejecting its claim of standing ,

the proposed opinion for the Court, written by Justice Stewart,
holds that if Sierra Club had only alleged some other iNR
interest, such as the fact that its members often camped in
MiRNRXX

Mineral King , an allegation which the Club specifiaally

refused to make, it would have had standing .
and Marshall x have joined Stewart's opiniono

So far the Chief
Justi~;:..f

Douglas -:,.

is writing a seperate opinion which I cannot characterize.
Justice Brenan is planning to dissent and would have found
standing .]
I think this case should be affirmed.
AFFI RM

Fox

. ..
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No. 71-288 LAIRD v. TATUM
Argued 3/27/72
Tentative Impressions*
1. Case and controversy (justiciable controversy). On this
issue, the Circuit Court found the following (in addition to various
other findings):
"The Army needs a certain amount of information
in order to perform (its) constitutional and statutory
missions. "
1

A . 'S;

2.

The Army has been called upon "to preserve domestic

peace against violent protests leading to civil disorders", a role
A •I"\ r'"
contemplated by the Constitution."' "Many violent protests were aimed
directly at military functions . . . ransacking Selective Service offices,
barring troup and supply trains . . . , unlawful attempts to enter military
A.. , , C",. I '
basis. ""In addition there were the Detroit and Newark riots: the

c.

national guard was called out 83 times during 1967-68, and the Army
four times "to quell cases of civil disorder".
3.

A I 1 l,

"The information gathered is nothing more than a good

I

newspaper reporter would be able to gather by attendance at public
*These impressions are dictated on the afternoon following argument
to record my initial and tentative impressions. I will have read,
in preparation for the arguments, the principal briefs, some of the
cases and the bench memo. I hope to do further study before the
Conference. My views are subject to change and to the discussion
at the Conference.

•'

2.
meetings and the clipping of articles from publications available on
any news stand."

A

I'

1-1 J r

Despite these findings, the majority judges concluded that a
justiciable controversy was alleged.

They reached this c cnclusion

by the following reasoning:

"Appellants contend that the present existence of this
system of gathering and distributing information,
allegedly far beyond the mission requirements of the
Army, constitutes an impermissible burden on
appellants and other persons similarly situated
which exercise a present inhibiting effect!' on
First Amendment rights.
ll'

A.

Judge MacKinnon, dissenting found there was no justiciable
controversy. He pointed to plaintiff's brief in which they state that:
"There is a threat of unknown surveillance, unknown
purpose and unknown future use of the information
gathered . . . "
1~

A

1

Judge MacKinnon, referring to this apprehension of the
"unknown", said:
"Such indefinite and abstract assertions of amorphous
fears do not present a case involving facts of a concrete
nature. "
1 ~'

It

The dissenting opinion also pointed out:
"There are no allegations or claims that any of the
information gathered by the Army has been used in
a manner that has injured plaintiffs or imposed on
them any penalty attributable to their exercise of
First Amendment rights. " (Appendix 151)

3.

,..'

Apparent Mootness:
If a proper case and controversy be assumed, there is a question

whether there is any need for judicial action.
The plaintiffs seek ( i) a declaratory judgment that Army
surveillance of lawful political activity is unconstitutional; (ii) a
permanent injunction against the spying and the maintaining of records;
and (iii) a mandatory injunction ordering the Army to produce and
destroy its records.
The remand ordered by the Circuit Court (from which this
appeal is taken) directs the district court to hear the case and determine:

1. The nature of the Army's intelligence system;
system
2. What part of this~ is necessary to discharge the

"

Army's need for domestic intelligence; and
3. Whether the Army's intelligence gathering system ''has or
might have an inhibiting effect on plaintiffs or others similarly
situated. "
In view, however, of the fact that the Army has disc ontinued

its system and voluntarily destroyed its data bank, these inquiries
would seem to serve no useful purpose.

4.
4.

Class action.

Judge MacKinnon thinks that this is not an
$

appropriate class action suit under rule 23(a). (Appendix 153)

-<

The

class described is incapable of definition; it could include millions
of citizens and hundreds of organizations; it would be impossible to
determine what rights have been or would be infringed that are common
to all of these people.

This is especially true since nothing has been

shown to indicate that the data gathered by the Army is not available
to the news media, all being derived from public gathering.
I doubt that the case could possibly managed as a class action
suit without an intolerable burden on the Court, and any decree entered
would not necessarily be binding on anyone except the Army.
5. A problem for legislation. It is doubtful whether a court
could fashion a decree that would accommodate the admitted need of
the military to collect intelligence data, and at the same time protect in a class action suit rather than a case involving specific injury to
-~
a particular individual First Amendment Rights of millions of people.

"

This can best be handled by legislation.

The Congress is in

a position to control the situation completely; to prescribe appropriate
limits on military intelligence activities; and to police such activities
in the future.

•·
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MEMO TO JUSTICE POWELL
Re: No. 71-288, Laird v. Tatum
You asked me to give you the leading case on each side
of this issue so that you could prepare for Conference.
Clearly the leading case is Flast v. Cohen, 392

u.s.

83 (1968).

_Elast held that a taxpayer had standing to sue on a claim that
a federal aid to education program violated the Establishment
Clause.

It is difficult for me to see how the harm alleged in

this case is any less specific than the harm alleged by a
plaintiff whose sole harm is that the miniscule part of his
taxes that is spent for this program is spent unconstitutionally"
On the other side, there is no leading case really.
is cited by the govt as much as any other case.

Flast

Perhaps one

case in the govt's favor is United Public Workers_y. Mitchell,
330

u.s.

75 (1947), but it is rather old and the concept of

justiciability has evolved to a considerable degree since 1947.
You might also want to take a look at Justice Stewart's
circulation in Sierra Club v. Morton, No. 70-34.
was argued last fall.

That case

The Court has voted that Sierra Club

did not have standing to sue, and Justice Stewart was assigned
the opinion.
him.

So far only the Chief and Marshall have joined

Douglas has circulated a seperate opinion, and Brennan

is dissenting but has not yet circulated anything.

However,

I think it is safe to say that at least 5 members of the Court
--Stewart, Chief, Marshall, Douglas, Brennan--go asxxxxx at
~east

as far as Stewart's opinion on the question of standing,

which is pretty far.
Fox
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5/31/72
MEMO TO JUSTICE POWELL
Re: No. 71-288, Laird v. Tatum
The Chief Justice has circulated an opinion, actually a
memorandum) in this case, and Justice Douglas has circulated
a dissent.

I am a bit at a loss to explain what the Chief's

opinion says.

I had thought this case was concerned with

the issues of standing and justiciability as they arise on
a motion to dismiss, that is without any facts being in the
record.

The Chief, however, goes outside the pleadings and

considers as facts affidavits intrcfiYced in the hearing on
the preliminary injurlction in this case.

These affidavits

cannot be accepted as true; indeed they are altogehter
irrelevant because on a motion to dismiss all that may be
considered are the pleadings which must be construed most
favorably._for the plaintiff.

Moreover, the Chief considers

other material concerning the Army's dismantling the surveilance
system which was not even in those affidavits.

None of these

things have been controverted by resps because they have never
been given an opportunity to do so.

They sought and were
~

denied a hearing below to controvert the govt's affidavits.

V,' ~
',/~~

It is therefor hig}y improper to not only consider these
affidavits, but to assume their truth,
Taking the allegations of resps as
Court must do on a motion to dismiss, the questio
the Court is whetherftnauthorized and
Army violates the Constitution in that it

spyin

this

~~ .

before

~~

~y

the

exercise,

by its very existence, of free speech and in that it invades
privacy. In rejecting this claim, the Chief notes, ."We do not

.

....

'•

-2-

believe that the determination of whether this complaintstates a claim upon which relief can be granted is to be made
on the basis of the identity of the parties named as defendants
in the complaint."

That, I submit, is a ludicrous proposition.
institutionxxx~

It says that a claim that surveilance by the Army, an

xxltx:ki!IXKNM!R'XIIOCXRR historically and to some extent, as Justice
Douglas points out in part I of his dissent, Constitutionally
distrusted in this country, is no more ominous than surveilance
by the Board of Tea Tasters, another instrumentality of the
federal government.

Of course the identify of a defendant

affects whether a complaintstates a cause of action; under a
§1983 complaint one of the crucia*-ssties in determining whether
a cause of action is stated is-to decide whether the defendant
is an instrumentality of the state and thereby acting under
state law.
Perhaps more important,the Chief says there is no
legally cognizable claim because there is no allegation that
an one has been fired from a job or thrown in jail bee
of misuse of the information the Army has gathered.

But

there is a claim that the very system
to chill the exercise of resps' first
claim that has been treated seriously in the pas •

In fact

resps include in their brief an essay on the sociological
realities of such a chilling effect for those who think
such a thing is not possible.

It may well be that there was

no chilling effect here, but that is a question of fact and
there are no facts in the record of this case.
Secondly, the Chief says there is no claim that any of

-3-

the information was gathered
true.

y ilQegal means.

That is not

Resps alleged that s ch unauthorized surveilance by

the Army was itself illegal, and Senator
specifically addressed this point.

E~in's

oral argument

Moreover, the complaint

did not allege, as the Chief implies that only legal means
"available to a newspaper reporter" were used; it alleged
nothing at all about means.

It said that the very existence

-

of the system, not the way it operated, was impermissible.
··J~

~~- ·

Finally, attached to the complaint as an exhibit was an

~written

by an ex-Army intelligence agent, and it

\

contains means of surveilance alleged to have been used
which if not illegal are certainly of questionable legality.
Third, it is incorrect to describe the complaint as
alleging only that the Army has collected information which
it does not need and which it might possibli misuse in the
future.

The complaint is that the existence of such a system

whether the information is misued or not, chills free speech
and invades privacy in violation of the Constitution.
Chief's statement is a distortion of the complaint.

The
This

complaint is not concerned with speculative wrong-doings.

~

7
~~ ~

If this complaint does not present a case that a court
may decide, then I am unable to see how a court can ever
consider a case based on an establishment of religion claim.
Certainly when the state impermissibly spends money to benefit
a particular religion, there is no direct injury to taxpayers
other than what propably amounts to a few cents worth.
only injury is to the Constitutional values.

The

How much less

-4-

precise and more speculative is such a complaint than this
in which it is alleged that the government is deliberately
chilling the exercise of free speech and invading the privacy
of citizens.

Yet we know that such establishment of religion

cases can be brought.
The Chief's fall-back line of argument is what I call
neo-mootness.

He cannot say that the case is moot because

that is a factual issue and because even the governement does
not allege that it has stopped these activities complete]y.
Instead, he says that "equity should stay its hand".
does this equitable doctrine come from?

Where

There is a doctrine

of abstention, but that is a branch of comity that arises in
federal-state cases.

There simply is no such doctrine.

Moreover, his attempt to distinguish the Wadmond case is
unsuccessful.

He says that that case involved a regulatory

system whereas presumably this case concerns an investagatory
system.

But why does that matter?

He does not say.

He

finally comes back to his same point--that this case is
based on hypothetical future conduct.

But that is simply

not true; the case is based on the chilling effect of the
existence of such a .e'Eatttte-• .s-irt-<'- fc.-cr-e.
-lh.e

Y'o-li""

At one point you expressed to meA that perh.a·ps this case
was like the welfare case the Court heard earlier in the year
in which the government enacted eleventh hour regulations.
I have always maintained that what the Court did in that
case was a disgraceful ducking of its judicial responsibility,
but I do not think the case is relevant here anyhow.

In

•·

-5that case, the issue was the legality of the regulations.
When those regulations were changed, the issue may have
been mooted.

But more importantly, aletering the regulations

may have offered the APTD recipients the relief they sought.
That certainly is not the case here.

Resps are not

seeki~g

to change the method in which the Army carries out its

s~rveilance

~~~

activities over civilians; they are claiming that the entire
system is illegal.

~
~

Only striking down the system would give

them the relief they claim for the invasion of their priv.acy
and chilling of their free speech.

case did not come up on a motion to dismiss and the case
was not dismissed but remanded.

~

In addition, the welfare

Even if the cases were

w!

parellel, the result should be to remand to the district ·
court to see if the case was in fact moot.

But that is not

t he result the Court proposes to reach.
The final irony about this case is that the Court
~

1'

~

t

~

proposes to dismiss a complaint as being too hypothetical
when we know from Sen Erwin' s hearings that there was in fact

an abuse of authority, a mis-[sVe of information, and probably
a chilling effect that resulted from these activities.
Although Justice Douglas refers to the Hearings in his dissent
they, like all the factual material the Chief refers to, are
not legally congnizable in the posture this case takes.
But it seems to me strange at best to wrench around standing
and justiciability in a way that is supported by no case law
in order to say that a case is too hypothetical when we know
in fact that it is not hypothetical at all.

Fox

, ,
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MR. JusTICE DouGLAS, dissenting.

I,

--

--: /'

I

If Congress had passed a law authorizing the armed
services to establish surveillance over the civilian population, a most ~erious constitutional problem would be
presented. There is, however, no such law under which
in this case the-15'entagon undertook surveillance over
,. I 0
civilians. The question is whether such authority may
be implied. One can search the Constitution in vain for
,.....
, 11 any such authority.
, (l _-f.u ~ 0 ~...t...
The start of the problem is the constitutional distinc1~· -1
~~ ~
tion between the "militia" and the Armed Forces. By
l
)
Art. I, § 7, of the Constitution the militia is specifically
I"
confined to precise duties: "to execute the laws of the
union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions."
This obviously means that the "militia" cannot be
sent overseas to fight wars. They are purely a domestic
arm of the governors of the ~everal States/ save as they
may be called under Art. I, § 8, of the Constitution into
the federal service. Whether the "militia" could be
given powers comparable to those granted the FBI is a
question not now raised. For we deal here not with the

( C:....L

I have expressed my doubts whether the "militia " Jo~rs it s
constitutional role by an Act of Congress which incorporate~ it
in the armed sen-ices. Drifka v. B mina.rd, 89 Sup. Ct. R rp. 434_
1

'f:t

(.C)

~(

8

f1

.I

"L 1f·
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"militia" but " ·ith "armies." The Army, Navy, and Air
Force are comprehended in the constitutional term
"armies." Art. I, § F, provides that Congress may "raise
and support armies," and "provide and maintain a navy,"
and make "rules for the government and regulation of
the land and naval forces." And the Fifth Amendment
excepts from the requirement of a presentment or indictment of a grand jury "cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the militia. when in actual service in time
of war or public danger."
Acting under that authority, Congress has provided a
code governing the Armed Services. That code sets the
procedural standards for the Government and regulation
of the land and naval forces. It is difficult to imagine (
how those powers can be extended to military surveillance
over civilian affairs.
The most pointed and relevant decisions of the Court
ou the limitation of military authority concern the attempt of the military to try civilians. The first leading
case was Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2, 124, where the
Court noted that the conflict between "civil liberty" and
"martialla\\'" is "irreconcilable." The Court which made
that am1ouncf'mcnt would have been horrified at the
prospect of the military- absent a regime of martial
la\\'-establishing a regime of survcil1ance over civilians.
The power of the military to establish such a system is
obviously less than the power of Congress to authorize
such surveillauce. For the authority of Congress is restricted by its po"·er to "raise" armies, Art. I , ~ 7; and,
to repeat. its authority over the Armed Forces is stated
in these terms, "To make rules for the government and
regulations of the land and naval forces. "
The Constitution contains many provisions guaranteeing rights to persons. Those include the right to indictment by a grand jury and the right to trial by a jury of
one's peers. It includes the procedural safeguards of the
Sixth Amendment in criminal prosecutions; the protec-

71-288-DISSENT
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tiou against double jeopardy, cruel and unusual punishments-and of course the First Amendment. The alarm
was sounded in the Constitutional Convention about the
dangers of the armed services. Luther Martin of Maryland said, " ... "·hen a government wishes to deprive its
citizcns of freedom and reduce them to slavery, it generally makes usc of a standing army." ~ That danger,
we have held, exists not only in bold acts of usurpation
of pmycr, but in gradual encroachments. We held that
court-martial jurisdiction cannot be extended to reach
any pcrson not a member of the Armed Forces at the
times both of the offense and of the trial, which eliminates discharged soldiers. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11.
Neither civilian employees of the Armed Forces overseas,
McElroy v. Guagliardo, 361 U. S. 281; Grisham v. H a jan,
361 U. S. 278, nor civilian dependents of military personnel accompanying them overseas, Kinsella v. Singleton,
361 U. S. 234; Reid v. Covert, 354 U. S. 1, may be tried
by court martial. And even as respects those in the
Armed Forces we have held that an offense must be
"service connected" to be tried by court-martial rather
than by civilian tribunals. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395
U. S. 2:38, 272.
The upshot is that the Armed Services-as distinguished from the "militia"-are not regulatory agencies
or bureaus that may be created as Congress desires and
grantcd such powers that seem necessary and proper.
The authority to provide rules "governing" the Armed
Services means the grant of authority to the Armed
Services to govern themselves, not the authority to govern civilians. Even when "martial law" is declared, as
it often has been, its appropriateness is subject to judicial rcvie\\', Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U. S. 378, 401,
403-404.
~ 3 Farrand, Records of the
p. 209.

Con~titutionnl

Convent ion (1911),

;

,.
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Our tradition reflects a desire for civilian supremacy
and subordination of military power. The tradition goes
back to the Declaration of Independence in which it was
recited that the King "has affected to render the military independent of and superior to the civil power."
Thus we have the "militia" restricted to domestic use,
the restriction of appropriations to the "armies" to two
years, Art. I, § 7, and the grant of command over the
armies and the 1nilitia when called into actual service
of the United States to the President, our chief civilian
officer. The tradition of civilian control over the Armed
Forces was stated by Chief Justice Warren: 3
i'The military establishment is, of course, a necessary organ of government; but the reach of its
power must be carefully limited lest the delicate
balance between freedom and order be upset. The
maintenance of the balance is made more difficult by
the fact that while the military services the vital
function of presrn-ing the existence of the nation,
it is, at the same time, the one element of government that exercises a type of authority not easily
assimilated in a free society....
"In times of peace, the factors leading to an extraordinary deference to claims of military necessity
have naturally not been as weighty. This has been
true even in the all too imperfect peace that has
been our lot for the past fifteen years-and quite
rightly so, in my judgment. It is instructive to recall that our Nation at the time of the Constitutional
Convention was also faced with formidable problems.
The English, the French, the Spanish, and various
tribes of hostile Indians were all ready and eager to
subvert or occupy the fledgling Republic. Nevertheless, in that environment, our Founding Fathers
3 The Bill of Rights and the 11ilitary, 37 N . Y. U. L. llcv . 1Sl ,
182, 193 (1962).
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conceived a Constitution and Bill of Rights replete
with provisions indicating that determination to protect human rights. There was no call for a garrison
state in those times of precarious peace. We should
heed no such call now. If we were to fail in these
days to enforce the freedom that until now has been
the American citizen's birthright, we would be abandoning for the foreseeable future the constitutional
belance of powers and rights in whose name we arm."
It was in that tradition that Youngstown Sheet ana
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, was decided in which
President Truman's seizures of the steel mills in the socalled Korean War was held unconstitutional. As stated
by Justice Black:
"The order cannot properly be sustained as an
exercise of the President's military power as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. The Government attempts to do so by citing a number
of cases upholding broad powers in military commanders engaged in day-to-day fighting in a theaterof war. Such cases need not concern us here. Even
though 'theater of war' be an expanding concept~
we cannot with faithfulness to our constitutional
system hold that the Commander in Chief of the·
Armed Forces has the ultimate power as such totake possession of private property in order to keep
labor disputes from stopping production. This is
a job for the Nation's lawmakers, not for its
military authorities." ld., 587.

Madison expressed the fear of military dominance:'
"The veteran legions of Rome were an overmatch
for the undisciplined valor of all other nations, and
rendered her the mistress of the world.
"Not the less true is it, that the liberties of Rome
4

The Federalist No. 41.
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proved the final victim to her military triumphs;
and that the liberties of Europe, as far as they ever
existed, have, with few exceptions, been the price
of her military establishments. A standing force,
therefore, is a dangerous, at the same time that it
may be a necessary, provision. On the smallest
scale it has its inconveniences. On an extensive·
scale its consequences may be fatal. On any scale
it is an object of laudable circumspection and precaution. A wise nation will combine all these considerations; and whilst it docs not rashly preclude
itself from any resource \Yhich may become essential t<> its safety, will exert all its prudence in diminishing both the necessity and the danger of resorting
to one which may be inauspicious to its liberties.
"The clearest marks of this prudence are stamped
on the proposed Constitution. The Union itself,
which it cements and secures, destroys every pretext
for a military establishment which could be dangerous. America united, with a handful of troops, or
without a single soldier, exhibits a more forbidding
posture to foreign ambition than America disunited,
with a hundred thousand veterans ready for combat."
As Chief Justice Warren has observed, the safeguards
in the main body of the Constitution did not sn,tisfy
the people on their fear and concern of military
dominance: r.
"They were reluctant to ratify the Constitution
without further assurances, and thus we find in the
Bill of Rights Amendments 2 and 3, specifically
authorizing a decentralized militia, guaranteeing the
right of the people to keep and bear arms, and prohibiting the quartering of troops in any house in
r.

Op. rit. n. 3, sup1"a, :~t 18!"\.
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time of peace without the consent of the owner.
Other Amendments guarantee the right of the people to assemble, to be secure in their homes against
umeasonable searches and seizures, and in criminal
cases to be accorded a speedy and public trial by
an impartial jury after indictment in the district
and state "·herein the crime was committed. The
only exceptions made to these civilian trial procedures are for cases arising in the land and naval
forces. Although there is undoubtedly room for
argument based on the frequently conflicting sources
of history, it is not unreasonable to believe that
our Founders' determination to guarantee the preeminence of civil over military power was an important element that prompted adoption of the Constitutional Amendments we call the Bill of Rights."
The action in turning the "armies" loose on surveillance of civilians \Yas a gross rcpudia tion of our
traditions. The military, though important to us, is
subservient and restricted purely to military missions.
It even took an Act of Congress to allow a member of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff to address the Congress; 6 and
that small step did not go unnoticed but was in faet
viewed with alarm by those respectful of the civilian
tradition. The act of turning the military loose on
civilians even if sanctioned by an Act of Congress. which
it has not been, would raise serious and profound constitutional questions. Standing as it docs only on brute
~

The Act of Angnst 10, 19·!9, proYidr~ in § 202 (c) (6):
"K o prori:;ion of this Aet ~hall be ~o ronstrucd as to prc1·rnt
:1 Serr0tnry- of a military dcpnrtmcnt or a m0mbcr of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff from prc1'10nting to the Congre~~. on hi:,; own initintiYe, :tftcr first so informing the Secr0tnry of Defense, ::my re('Ommcndation rclnting to the Df'pnrtmcnt of Df'fen~e th:1t he may dC'rm
proper."
G

l
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power and Pentagon policy, it must be re1mdiated as a
USUii)ation dangerous to the civil liberties on 1vhich free
men are dependent.
II
The claim that respondents have no standing to challenge the Army's surveillance of them and the other
members of the class they seek to represent is too transparent for serious argument. The surveillance of the
Army over the civilian sector-a part of society hitherto
immune from their control-is a serious charge. It is
alleged that the Army maintains files on the membership,
ideology, programs, and practices of virtually every activist political group in the country, including groups like
the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Clergy
and Laymen United Against the War in Vietnam, The
American Civil Liberties Union, "ViTomens Strike for Peace,
and the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People. The Army uses undercover agents to
infiltrate these civilan groups and to reach into confidential files of students and other groups. The Army
moves as a secret group among civilian audiences, using
cameras and an electronic ear for surveillance. The data
it collects are distributed to civilian officials in state, federal, and local governments and to each military intelligence unit and troop command under the Army's jurisdiction (both here and abroad); and these data are
stored in one or more data banks. Those are the allegations; and the charge is that the purpose and effect of
the system of surveillance is to harass and intimidate the
respondents and to deter them from exercising their rights
of political expression , protest, and dissent "by invading
their privacy, damaging their reputations, adversely affecting their employment and their opportunities for
employment and in other ways." Their fear is that
"permanent reports of their activities will be maintained
in the Army's data bank, and their 'profiles' will appear
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in the so-called 'Blacklist' and that all of this information
will be released to numerous federal and state agencies·
upon request."
Judge Wilkey, speaking for the Court of Appeals,
properly held that this Army surveillance "exercises a
present inhibiting effect on their full expression and utilization of their First Amendment rights." 444 F. 2d, at
That is the test. The "deterrent effect" on First
Amendment rights by government oversight marks an
unconstitutional intrusion, Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U. S. 301, 307. Or as stated by MR. JusTICE
BRENNAN, "inhibition as well as prohibition against the
exercise of precious First Amendment rights is a power
denied to government." /d., at 309. When refusal of
the Court to pass on the constitutionality of an Act under
the normal consideration of forbearance "would itself
have an inhibitory effect on freedom of speech" then the
Court will act. United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 32.
As stated by the Supreme Court of New Jersey, "there
is good reason to permit the strong to speak for the weak
or the timid in First Amendment matters." Anderson
v. Sills, 56 N. J. 210, 220 (1970).
One need not wait to sue until he loses his job or until
his reputation is defamed. To withhold standing to sue
until that time arrives would in practical effect immunize
from judicial scrutiny all surveillance activities regardless of their misuse and their deterrent effect. As stated
in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, 101, " ... in terms of
Article III limitations on federal court jurisdiction, the
question of standing is related only to whether the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an
adversary context and in a form historically viewed as
capable of judicial resolution." Or as we put it in Baker
v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 204, the gist of the standing issue
is whether the party seeking relief has "alleged such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to.

~
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assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions."
The present controversy is not a remote, imaginary
conflict. Respondents were targets of the Army's surveillance. First, th_e surveillance \vas not casual but
massive and comprehensive. Second, the intelligence
reports were regularly and widely circulated and were
exchanged '"ith reports of the FBI, state and n1unicipal
police departments, and the CIA. Third, the Army's
surveillance was not collecting material in public records
but staking-out teams of agents, infiltrating undercover
agents, creating command posts inside meetings, posing
as press photographers and newsmen, posing as TV newsmen, posing as students, shadowing public figures.
Finally, we know from the hearings conducted by
Senator Erwin that the Army has misused or abused its
reporting functions. Thus Senator Erwin concludes that
reports of the Army ha.-e been "taken from the Intelligence Command's highly inaccurate civil disturbance
teletype and filed in Army dossiers on persons who have
held, or were being considered for, security clearances,
thus contaminating "·hat are supposed to be investigative
reports 'vith unverified gossip and rumor. This practice
directly jeopardized the employment and employment
opportunities of persons seeking sensitive positions with
the federal government or defense industry." 7
Surveillance of civilians is none of the Army's constitutional business and Congress has Hot undertaken to
entrust it with any such function. The fact that since
this litigation started the Army's surveillance has been

--

1
Hearings, Subcommittee on Con~titutional Hi~h1s, Sen. Jnd. Committee, 92d Cong., bt Sess., Feb. 23-25, Mnrch 2-4, 9-11, 15, 17
(1971).

71-2SS-D1SSENT

LAIHD v. TATUM

11

cut back is not an end of the matter. Whether there
has been an actual cutback or whether the announcements are merely a ruse can be determined only after a
hearing in the District Court. W c arc advised by an
arnicus brief filed by a group of former Army Intelligence
Agents that Army surveillance of civilians is rooted in
s~ programs of long standing. "Army_ intelligence
has been maintaining an unauthorized watch over civilian
political activity for nearly 30 years. Nor is this the
first time that Arrny intelligence has, without notice to
its civilian superiors, overstepped its mission. From 1917
to 1924, the Corps of Intelligence Police maintained a
massive surveillance of civilian political activity which
involved the use of hundreds of civilian informants, the
infiltration of civilian organizations and the seizure of
dissenters and unionists, sometimes " ·ithout charges.
That activity was opposed-then as now-by civilian officials on those occasions when they found out about it,
but it continued unabated until post-war disarmament
and economies finally eliminated the bureaucracy that
conducted it."
This case is a cancer in our body politic. It is a measure of the disease which afflicts us. ~rmy_ surveillance,
1~ rmy J.'egimentation, is at war wit the principles of
the
m ndment. 'I11o'Se "·ho already walk sub, . _ .Fir
-missively will say there is no cause for alarm. But submissiveness is not our heritage. The First Amendment
was designed to allow rebellion to remain as our heritage.
The Constitution was designed to keep government off
the backs of the people. The Bill of Rights was added
to keep the precincts of belief and expression, of the
press, of political and social activities free from surveillance. The Bill of Rights was designed to keep agents
of government and official eavesdroppers away from assemblies of people. The aim was to allow men to be
free and independent and to assert their rights against
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government. There can be no influence more paralyzing
of that objective than Army surveillance. When an Intelligence Officer looks over every nonconformist's shoulder in the library or walks invisibly by his side in a picket
line or infiltrates his club, the America once extolled as
the voice of liberty around the world no longer is cast
in the image which Jefferson and Madison designed.
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MR. JUSTICE BHENN AN, dissenting.
The Court of Appeals held that a justiciable controversy exists and that petitioners state a claim upon
which relief could be granted. 444 F. 2d 947, 958.
I agree with Judge Wilkey, writing for the Court of
Appeals, that this conclusion is compelled for the following reasons stated by him:
/
" ... [A]ppellants conten~ that the present existence !2l this syst em of gathering and distributing
information, allegedly far beyond the mission requirements of thr Army, constitutes an impermissible burden on [petitioners] and other persons
similarly situated >vhich exercises a presen t inhibiting effect on their full expression and utilization
of their First Amendment rights of free speech, etc.
The baleful effect, if there is one, is thus a present
inhibition of lawful behavior and of First Amendment rights.
"Under this view of fpetitioner's] allegations,
under justiciability standards it is the operation
of the system itself which is the breach of the
Army's duty toward Jf;etitioners] and other civilians. The case is t erefore ripe for adjudication.
Because the evil alleged in the Army intelligence
system is that of overbreadth, i. e., the collection
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of information not reasonably relevant to the Army's
mission to suppress civil disorder, and because there
is no indication that a better opportunity "·ill arise
to test the constitutionality of the Army's action ,
the issue can be considered justiciable at this time."
Id., 954- 956 (emphasis in original).
Further, and, in my view, the complete answer to the
basis of the Court's disposition today:
"To the extent that the Army's a.rgument against
justiciability here includes the claim that [petitioners] lack standing to bring this action, we cannot agree. If the Army's system does indeed derogate First Amendment values, the [petitioners] are
persons who are sufficiently affected to permit
their complaint to be heard. The record shows
that most if not all of the [petitioners] and/ or
the organizations of which they are members have
been the subject of Army surveillance and the·
names have appeared m the Army's records. Since
this is precisely the injury of which [petitioners]
complain, they have standing to seek redress for
that alleged injury in court and will provide the·
necessary adversary interest that is required by the
standing doctrine, on the issue of whether the actions
complained of do in fact inhibit the exercise of
First Amendment rights. Nor should the fact that
these particular persons are sufficiently uninhibited
to bring this suit be any ground for objecting to·
their standing." I d., at 954, n. 17.
Petitioners may or may not be able to prove the·
case they allege. But I agree with the Court of Appeals that they are entitled to try. I would therefore
affirm the remand to the District Court for a trial and
determination of the issues specified by the Court of
Appeals.
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No. 71-288 -- Laird v. Tatum
My records show a conference vote of 4 - 4 with one vote tentative in
each 4.

I rese rved at the time and further study of the case led to a deci s ion

to reverse, with possible consideration of a remand if needed.

It now seems

to me that a remand is unnecessary.

The petitioners here are the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of
the Army, the Chief of Staff of the Army, and the Commanding General of
the Army Intelligence Command.

They were named as defendants in a com.-

; ,.

plaint filed in the District Court by respondents, who are four individuals
'.

and nine unincorporated membership associations.

The respondents brought

.

the action in behalf of themselves and ''all other individuals and organizations

~.'

who wish to exercise their right under the First Am.endment • • . to engage in
peaceful political prate st • . • and other forms of constitutionally protected
~~'

expression and a ssemblies without surveillance by [petitioners'] agents and

..

. j

without becon"ling the subject of dossiers, reports, and files . • • .

11

.
"

.'
,.

-2Petitioners, without filing an answer to the con>plaint, moved to dismiss, and
the District Court granted the motion.

On respondents' appeal from the order

of dismissal, a divided Court of Appeals reversed and ordered the case remanded for further proceedings. We have concluded that the Jomplaint was
properly dismissed by the Distrist Court, and we accordingly lever se the
judgment of the Court of Appeals.
The complaint alleged that petitioners, acting through the Army Intelli-

---------------'-

gence Command, were engaged in the surveillance of lawful civilian political
activity; that information about such activity was collected from a variety of
reporting sources, including the Army's agents, the Federal

Du~eau

·'

of In-

vestigation, and state and local police departments; that the information so
(·~·

collected was compiled and stored in a computerized data bank located at the
Army Intelligence Command Headquarters at Fort Holabird, Maryland;
that the reports submitted by the Army's agents were also widely disseminated
to Army outposts; that a so-called "blacklist'' containing verbal "profiles" of
various individuals and organizations was published by the Army and distributep "
within Army Intellig ence circles; and that the Army contemplated making
information contained in the computerized data bank available to "numerous
federal and state agencies upon request.

11

..

The complaint further alleged

that the "purpose and effect" of the Army 1 s surveillance program was to "harass

.. •

and intimidate" respondents and others similarly situated and "to deter them
from exercising their rights of political expression . • . protected by the
II

First Amendment; and that respondents and others similarly situated were

/

.

'
'
"'····

.....·'

\

.

-3being irreparably injured.

Respondents sought as relief a declaratory

judgement that the Army was exceeding its statutory and constitutional
authority in engaging in these activities, an injunction against the continuation

of the activities, and a judgment mandating the destruction of
heretofore compiled in the course of those activities.

tl

records
II'\

\

"'
(1)

Although the District Court dismissed the complaint without an answer
~

..

having been filed by petitioners, there is in the record a considerable amount

-------------------

-

of background information regarding the activities of which respondents

-----------------~--~~----------------------·---Both parties filed a number of affidavits and other material

--

complained.

in

connection with respondents 1 motion for a preliminary injunction and with
petitioners 1 motion to dismiss.

See Rule 12 (b), Fed. R. Civ. P.

A brief

,.
review of that information is helpful to an understanding of the issues.

.~
v

The President is authorized by 10 U.S. C. § § 331-332 to make use

'

,.,
•
' ·.'

I V

.,!,

of the armed forces to quell insurrection and other domestic violence if and

~;,,

when the conditions describe d in those sections obtain within one or more

]j
of the states.

,.

~... !

Pursuant to these provisions, President Johnson ordered

!/

The constitutionality of these statutory provisions is not at issue
here, but their specific authorization of such use of federal armed forces, in
addition to state militia, appears to be fully compatible with the requirement
of Article IV. § 4, that the 11 United States • • • shall protect each of [the
individual States] . • • on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive
(when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence. 11

·-~-·~·

-3a-

federal troops to assist local authorities at the time of the civil disorders w
Detroit, Michigan in the summer of 1967 and during the disturbances that
followed the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King.

Prior to the Detroit

disorders, the Army had a general contingency plan for provi\d ing such
\

as sistanc c to local authorities, but the 196 7 experience led Ar my authorities
1

to believe that more attention should be given to such preparatory planning.
The surveillance system here involved is said to have been established in
connection with the development of more detailed and specific contingency
planning.

•,

-4The system consisted essentially of the collection of information
about public activities that were thought to have at least some potential for
civil disorder, the reporting of that information to Army Intelligence h ead-

..

\

quarters at Fort Holabird, the headquarters' dissemination of these reports

...

to major Army posts around the country, and the storage of the\ reported information in a domestic surveillance computer data bank located at Fort
Holabird.

--

The information itself was collected by a variety of means; the

-----------------------------~------~-----consisted of
principal source of information
items clipped from newspapers and other
--------~~

->.

publications in general circulation.

.

....
. ..
....(

Some of the information came from Army

~

------..···----·

J':'.•·

Intelligence agents who attended public meetings and wrote field reports

I

describing the meetings, giving such data as the name of the sponsoring organization, the identity of speakers, the approxilnate number of persons in

.

'<

attendance, and an indication of whether any disorder occurred.
The material filed by the government in the District Court reveals

....
,..

that Army Intelligence has field offices in various parts of the country;
these offices are staffed in the aggregate with approximately 1, 000 agents,
94% of whose time is devoted to the organization's principal mission, which
---...,.

is unrelated to the domestic surveillance system here involved.

That principal

mission was described in one of the documents filed with the District Court
as the conducting of "investigations to determine whether uniformed members
of the Army, civilian employees [of the Army] and contractors' employees
should be granted access to classified information."

(/

(App. at 76-77.)
•:

.·"

·'"

-5In early 1970 Congress became concerned with the scope of the
Army's domestic surveillance system; hearings on the rr:atter were held
before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary.

\

Meanwhile, the Army, in the course of a reiiew of the

I

The

system, ordered a significant reduction in its scope.

info~mation

re-

£erred to in the complaint as the "blacklist'' and the records in the computer
data bank at Fort Holabird were found unnecessary and were destroyed, along
with other related records.

One copy of all the material relevant to the

instant suit was, however, retained for possible use in this litigation.
at 72.)

(App.

The review leading to the destruction of these records was said at

the time the District Court ruled on petitioners' motion to dismiss to be a
"continuing" one (App. at 82), and the Army's policies at that time were represented as follows in a letter from the Under Secretary of the Army to

•

Senator Sam J. Ervin, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional
Rights:
"[RJ eports concerning civil disturbances will be limited to
matters of immediate concern to the Army --that is, reports concerning outbreaks of violence or incidents with
a
high potential for violence beyond the capability of state
}
and local police and the National Guard to control. These
reports will be collected by liaison with other Government
agencies and reported by teletype to the Intelligence Command. They will not be placed in a computer . . . •
These reports are destroyed 66 days after publication or
I 60 days after the end of the disturbance. This limited reporting system will ensure that the Army is prepared to
respond to whatever directions the President may issue 1n
civil disturbance situations and without watching lawful
activities of civilians." (App. at 80)

-6In briefs for petitioners filed with this Court, the Solicitor General
has called our attention to certain directives issued by the Army and the
Department of Defense subsequent to the District Court 1 s dismissal of the com-

..

I

plaint; these directives indicate that the Army 1 s review of the \ needs of its
I

domestic intelligence activities has indeed been a continuing ore and that

I

those activities, which now seem to have been out of proportion to the Army 1 s

..

~-

...··•...

actual needs in the past, have since been significiantly reduced.
(2)

The District Court held a combined hearing on respondents 1 motion

-------------·--~--~---·-·

for a preliminary injunction and petitioners 1 motion for dismissal and
._..,.,....-

.....

.-.- _,................

~......

....

~. r

........

~,...,.........-.....,::war-.__

...,.

thereafter announced its holding that respondents had failed to state a claim
.....

,..,...

...,._.~....

,..-.,..._.....,.

upon which relief could be granted,

w::=--

~

,..,

,..,

?")

It was the view of the District Court

)<I

•,.>

that the complaint failed to allege any action on the part of the Army that

'.,

,

.,_

was unlawful in itself and further failed to allege any realistic threats to

2j
respondents

1

1

rights growing out of the Army s actions.

r

..

,,,

~I

In the course of the oral argument the district judge sought clarification from respondents 1 counsel as to the nature of the threats perceived by
respondents; he asked what exactly it was in the Army 1 s activities that tended
to chill respondents and others in the exercise of their constitutional rights.
Counsel responded that it was

I

•"•

''precisely the threat in this case that in s01ne future civil disorder
of some kind, the Army is going to come in with its list of troublemakers . • . and go rounding up people and putting them in n~ili
tar ~· prisons somewhere. 11

l

To this the court responded that "we still sit here with the writ of habeas corpus. ,.
At another point, counsel for respondents took a somewhat different approach in
arguing that

1 "we're not q_uite

sure _!!xactly what they have in mind and that i s . .12!.!;.\ cisely what causes the chill, the chilling effe c : ."
-

...

'

-7In reversing the District Court, the Court o£ Appeals noted that the
Army does inde e d need a certain amount o£ information to carry out its
mission in regard to domestic violence beyond the capability of local authori\ ties to control.

I

It noted also that even though respondents had not alleged
-

=-

any unlawful activity on the part of the Army, they had alleged that
"the present existenc e of this system of gathering and distributing information, allegedly far beyond the mission requirements
of the Army, . • . exercises a present inhibiting effect on their
full expression and utilization of their First Amendment rights .

...
"

y'

Under this view of [respondents'] allegations, . • • it is the
operation of the system itself which is the breach of th
y's
duty;. toward [respondents and Other sJ_vilianS o II
444 F. Zd 94 7, 954: '( Emphasis 1n .o.riginal.)
The Court of Appeals considered it "significant 11 that the source of the alleged
chill here was the Army, rather than a civilian agency, and sought to distinguish

~I
the instant case from another of its recent decisions

primarily on that ground.

We do not believe that the determination of whether this complaint

--------------------------------------------------------------states a claim upon which relief can be granted is to be made on the basis of
the identity of the parties named as defendants in the complaint.

7

The

controlling question here is whether the respondents have alleged a legally
cognizable injury.

We hold that they 1:a ve not.

There is ro claim here that

3_!
In Davis v. Ichord, 442 F. Zd 1207 (CA-DC 1970), a different
panel of the same court upheld the dismissal of a complaint attacking the
maintenance of "dossiers 11 on political dissenters in the files of the Internal
Security Committee of the House of Representatives.

J
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of the information gathered by the Army has been used against re·'

spondents or anyone else; nor is there any claim that there have been threats

i

of such use.

r-

There is no claim that any information has been gathered by

1

tre Army by unlawful means, nor indeed that the Army has collected any
information other than that available to a newspaper reporter or to those
I
.
members of the general public w:Lo choose to attend various open meetings
and demonstrations.

The claim rather is that the Army has collected m-

formation that it does not need; that, should the Army at some future date

...

decide to proceed unlawfully to arrest citizens and deprive them of their

~

..

liberty without due process of law, that information could quite possibly
be used to single out respondents and other political activists for such

··::
unlawful treatment; and that, short of such an extreme circumstance, the

•.

Army might possibly make some presently unforeseeable use of that
information to the detriment of respondents and the class whose interests
they seek to represent.
The jurisdiction of the federal courts is limited by Article III of the

;

,.

Constitution to "cases" and "controversies'' arising between adverse

'
litigants.

11

A declaration on rights as they stand must be sought, not on

rights which may arise in the future . • • •
567 (1945).

11

In Re Summers,

325 U.S. 561,

In recent years this Court has found in a number of cases that

constitutional violations m .ay arise from the deterrent, or "chilling,''
effect of governmental regulations that fall short of a direct prohibition
against the exercise of First Amendment rights. E.

z..,

Baird v. State

r

C~a-j -ts
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f

a .....

pc•Jt

Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1 (1971); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967);
I
1

Ke yishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384
I

U.S. 11 ( 1966); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 ( 1965 ); Baggett
I
I

v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); N. A. A. C. P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
1

-

These cases have not, however, eroded the

l

"established principle that to entitle a private individual to
invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of executive
or legislative action he must show that he has sustained or is
immediately in danger of sustaining a direct in'ury as the result
oft at achon and it is not s
1c1ent that he has merely a
general interest common to all members of the public.'' Ex Parte
Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937).
Not only is there no direct prohibition against respondents' exercise

..

of their First Amendment rights involved here, but there is in fact no
alle ation of any governmental regulation or limitation of any of their activiLes.
There is no claim of the denial of an individual's right to pursue his vocational
calling for f a ilure to answer questions posed by a governmental agency, as in
Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, supra; nor any claim that respondents have
been required to choose between giving up their employment or thei. r political
associations in orde ·· to avoid liability to criminal prosecution, as in United
States v. Robel, supra; nor any claim of discharge or threatened discharge
from employment by a governmental agency for political acts or associations,
as in Keyishian v. Board of Regents, supra.

Nor is the claim here like that

in Lamont v. Postmaster General, supra, where a governmental agency had
required that an individual take son.J.e affirmative action in order to avoid
official interference with his receipt of certain kinds of political literature

.....

-10-

,...

Ii

through the normal channels of communication; nor is it like that in Baggett
I

I

v. Bullitt, supra, where subscriptio n to an oath of vague and uncertain mean,"'-

i.

ing was prescribed as a condition of employment by a governmental agency.

I

Nor is there any claim here, as inN. A. A. C. P. v. Alabama, supra, that an
I

I

an organization has been required under pain of officially imposed sanction

I

to reveal its membership list to a governmental agency.

Rather, the claim

----------,J

,.

here, simply stated, is that respondents disagree with the judgments made by

--

the Executive branch with respect to the Army's need for information

·~--------------------------'

and

I

are fearful that at :some future time the Army might make some unlawful or

4/
Stripped to its essentials, what respondents appear to be seeking is
a broad scale investigation, corrl ucted by themselves as private parties armed
with the subpoena power of a federal district court and the power of eros sexamination to robe into the Army's intelli ence -gathering activities, with the
district court determ1mng a the conclusion of that investigation the extent to
which those activities may or may not be appropriate to the Army's mission.
Cf. the following excerpt from the opinion of the court of appeals:

)

"Apparently in the judgment of the civilian head of the Army not
everything being done in the operation of this intelligence system
was necessary to the performance of the military mission. If the
Secretary of the Army can formulate and implement such judgment based on facts within his Departmental knowledge, the United
States District Court can hear evidence, ascertain the facts, and
decide what, if any further restrictions on the complained-of activities are called for to confine the military to their legitimate sphere of
activity and to protect appellants 1 allegedly infringed constitutional
rights. 11 444 F. Zd 947, 958.

....".

....
'

,('

l
't

Absent a judicially cognizable injury or threatened injury, such an enterprise,
while quite appropriate for a Committee of the Congress, is not one for the
federal courts.

't

I
I'
I
.
otherw1se

-11-

harrniul use of the allegedly excessive information it has been

5/

I

I

gathering.

-

Speculative apprehensions arising out of the mere possibility

of future wrongdoing are not sufficient to make out a claim for judicial relief.

~ ------------------------------------------------~
Respondents point to Law Students Research Council v. Wadmond,
401 U.S. 154 (1971), aff'g

"

.'

299 F. Supp. 117 (S.D.N. Y. 1969}, as a case

I

where we implicitly found federal court jurisdiction over a challenge to a
\

11

system [that] by its very existence [allegedly] works a 'chilling effect' upon

the free exercise" of First Amendment rights.

\

401 U.S. at 159.

Wadmond

is inapposite, however, since the "system" challenged there was a regula tory
system;

specifically, it was a system of statutory provisions governing the

admission of applicants to the Bar of New York;
to law practice was available.

·.

,..

no other route for admission

No issue respecting subject matter jurisdiction

was presented by the parties when the Wadmond case was here, although the
three-judge District Court explicitly held that the three complainants who were
duly enrolled law students had standing to challenge the regul :ttory scheme
because, as the District Court viewed the matter, those students had "set
th emselves apart from the public at large'' by undertaking a course of study

E_l
Even assuming arguendo that respondents presented an Article
III "case" at the time they filed their complaint, the representations of
the Government indicate that equity should stay its hand in this instance.
A federal court "does not sit to decide arguments after events have put them
to rest." Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429, 433 (1952).
Even though in some circumstances a "court's power to grant injunctive
relief survives discontinuance of the illegal conduct," it is only by showing
that future harm is realistically threatened that "tl·,e moving party [can]
satisfy the court that relief is needed." United States v. W. T. Grant Co.,
345 u.s. 629, 633 (1953}.

.

'

.•.

-12-

,.),

'

specifically directed to prepare them for the practice of law.
122.

,.

299 F. Supp., at

l. '

..

.'

>.•

Of more relevance to the issue in the instant case, it was not necessary

in Wadmond, as it is here, to hypothesize lawless or otherwise improper
..... f.

future conduct on the part of the defendants in order to foresee possible future

!2_1
harm to the plaintiffs that might give rise to a present "chilling effect."

I
Although we hold that respondents 1 complaint was properly dismissed
by the District Court, no view is intimated as to the propriety or desirability,

...

from a policy standpoint, of the challenged activities of the Department of the

]_/
Army.

The conclusion th at no case or controversy is presented

does not
,'o)

imply any judicial evaluation of the activities complained of;

I

our conclusion

is a narrow one, namely, that in the present posture of the case, the parties 1
fears for the future do not present a case for resolution by the courts; rather

...

',

<
1•.

...

,

~.

.

...•'

!:_I
On the merits , we upheld the constitutionality of the rules and
other statutory provisions challenged in Wadmond.

]_/
Since we find no case or controversy here, we have no occasion
to reach the standing issue raised by petitioners. As the Court explained
in Flast v. Cohe n, 392 U.S. 83, 99-100 (1968), questions of standing
relate to "whether the [plaintiff] is a proper party to request an adjudication
of a particular is sue and not whether the is sue its elf is justiciable. "

.-

,.

'

,,..

··~

'·'

..

<•

.,

t.

.

-13the matter may be safely left for continued consideration by the political
branches to which the cha llen g es are more properly addressed.

When and

if present or inunedia t e ly threatened injury is alleged, there will be time
enough for courts to pursue the matter.

The documentary evidence set

out in the record in this case and reviewed earlier reveals that the E x ecutive

i
and Legislative branches have actively concerned themselves with the
scope and purpose of the challenged activities,

The Executive branch has

taken steps to cut back significantly on the Army's collection of information
about civilians, having found, apparently, that much of what was being done
was inappropriate to the Army's limited role.

The Congress can, on the

basis of its hearings, further restrict that activity by enacting new legislation,
,-

should it see fit to do so.
The concern of the Executive and Legislative branches in response
to disclosure of the Army surveillance activities -- and indeed the claims
alleged in the complaint -- reflects a traditional and strong resistance of
Americans to any military intrusion into civilian affairs.

That tradition

has deep roots in our history and found early expression, for example,
in the Third A1nendment's explicit prohibition against quartering soldiers
in private homes without consent and in the broad provisions for civilian
control of the military.

Those prohibitions are not directly presented by

this case, but their philosophical underpinnings explain our traditional inIndeed,
sistence on lin'lita tions on military operations in peacetime. t \ when presented
with claims of judicially cognizable injury resulting from military intrusion

.

'

-14into the civilian sector, federal courts are fully empowered to provide reI

lief t o those suffering such i n jury; there is nothing in our Nation's history
of in this Court's decided cases, including our holding today, that can

..

I

properly be seen as giving any indication that actual or threatened injury

.,,

by reason of unlawful activities of the military would go unnoticed or un-

.

remedied.

.,

!

.

.

~

Reversed.

.
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8 1972
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__,___

Respondents brought this class action in the Distric-A ourt lseeking
declaratory and injunctive relief on their claim that their rights were being
invaded by the Army's alleged ''surveillance of lawful civilian political activity." .
The petitioners in response describe the activity as "g athering by lawful
means, • . . [and] maintaining and using in their intelligence activities,
information relating to potential or actual civil disturbances [or] street
demonstrations. " In connection with respondents 1 motion for a preliminary

. ;· . ..
,.~

injunction and petitioners' motion to dismiss the complaint, both parties
h:;o.·~
~;~,:~

filed a number of affidavits with the District Court and presented their oral
·..

arguments at a hearing on the two motions.

On the basis of the pleadings,

the affidavits before the court, and the oral arguments advanced at the hearing,

i'

-~

·•.

\

•.

·.

the District Court granted petitioners' motion to dismiss, holding that there
was no justiciable claim for relief.

,.,
'... .
l

On appeal, a divided Court of Appeals reversed and ordered the case
remanded for further proceedings.

We granted certiorari to consider whether,

'~

<

••

··~

·''

-2as the Court of Appeals held, respondents presented a justiciable controversy
in complaining of a chilling effect on the exercise of their First Amendment
rights where such effect is allegedly caused, not by any

11

specific action of

the Army against them, [but] only [by] the existence and operation of the
intelligence gathering and distributing system, which is confined to the Army
and related civilian investigative agencies.

11

444 F. 2d 947, 953.

We reverse.

(1)
There is in the record a considerable amount of background information regarding the activities of which respondents complained; this information is set out primarily in the affidavits that were filed by the parties in
connection with the District Court 1 s consideration of respondents 1 motion for
a preliminary injunction and petitioners 1 motion to dismiss.
Fed. R. Civ. P.

See Rule 12 (b),

A brief review of that information is helpful to an under-

standing of the issues.
The President is authorized by 10 U.S. C. §§ 331-332 to make use of
the armed forces to quell insurrection and other domestic violence if and
when the conditions described in those sections obtain within one or more

}j
of the States.

Pursuant to these provisions, President Johnson ordered

]_/
The constitutionality of these statutory prov1s1ons is not at issue
here, but their specific authorization of such use of federal armed forces, in
addition to state militia, appears to be full y compatible with the requirement of
Article IV, § 4, that 11 [t]he United States . • . shall protect each of [t he individual States] . • . on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive
(when the Legislature cannot be convened} a gain s t domestic Violence. 11

.

'

-3federal troopsto assist local authorities at the time of the civil disorders in
Detroit, Michigan in the summer of 1967 and during the disturbances that
followed the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King.

'

.,

Prior \to the Detroit

disorders, the Army had a general contingency plan for providing such

..

\

assistance to loca 1 authorities, but the 1967 experience led Army authorities
to believe that more attention should be given to such preparatory planning.
The data-gathering system here involved is said to have been established in

•

I

connection with the development of more detailed and specific contingency
planning designed to permit the Army, when called upon to assist local
'

authorities, to be able to res pond effectively with a minimum of force.

As

..-·

the Qour t of Appeals observed,
"In performing this type function the Army is essentia-lly
a police force or the back-up of a local police force. To quell
disturbances or to prevent further disturbances the Army needs
the same tools and, most importantly, the same information to
which local police forces have access. Since the Army is sent
into territory almost invariably unfamiliar to most soldiers and
their commanders, their need for information is likely to be
greater than that of the hometown policeman.

.,,

.

;

"No logical argument can be made for compelling the military
to use blind force. When force is employed it should be intelligently directed, and this depends upon having reliable information
in time. As Chief Justice John Marshall said of Washington,
'A general must be governed by his intelligence and must regulate
his 1neasures by his information. It is his duty 1n obtain correct
information . . . • ' So we take it as undeniable that the military,
i.e. , the Army, need a certain amount of information in order to
perfonn their constitutional and statutory missions. 11 444 F. 2d,
at 953 (footnotes omitted).
The system put into operation as a result of the Army's 1967 experi-

"'

.}:.._'!
r•

.. '
>-,
I•
I

....:~.

,.,
.,..,'•

.. '·
.l. .,.

..
'

...

ence consisted essentially of the collection of information a bout public
"

,.. •. t

:•I
'.

l

•

..

.;

I

-4activities that were thought to have at least some potential for civil disorder,

I

the reporting of that information to Army Intelligence headquarters at Fort
I
I

:.

Holabird, Maryland, the dissemination of these reports from headquarters
!

to major Army posts around the country, and the storage of the reported
I

ip.formation in a computer data bank located at Fort Holabird.

The information

,.

\

itself was collected by a variety of means, but it is significant that the
I

principal source:> of information v.ere the news media
general circulation.

and publications in

Some of the information came from Army Intelligen c e

agents who attended meetings that were open to the public and who wrote field
reports describing the meetings, giving such data as the name of the sponsoring
organization, the identity of speakers, the approximate number of persons
in attendance, and an indication of whether any disorder occurred.

And still

other information was provided to the Army by civilian law enforcement
agencies.
The rna terial filed by the government in the District Court reveals that
Army Intelligence has field offices in various parts of the country; these

; "

offices are staffed in the aggregate with approximately 1, 000 agents, 94%

?:_I
of whose tim r is devoted to the organization's principal mission,

which

is unrelated to the domestic surveillance system here involved.

2

That principal mis sian was described in one of the docurnents filed
with the district court as the conducting of llinvestigations to detern1ine
whether uniformed men1bers of the Army, civilian employees [of the Arm.y)
and contractors' en1.ployees should be granted access to classified information.
(App. at 7 6-7 7. )

11

·'-

-5By early 1970 Congress became concerned with the s c ope of the
Army's domestic surveillance system; hearings on the matter were held
before the Subc01nmittee on Constitutional Rights of the
on the Judiciary.

Sena~

Committee

Meanwhile, the Army, in the course of a review of the

system, ordered a significant reduction in its scope.

·"

For example, informa-

·•

tion referred to in the complaint as the "blacklist" and the records in the
computer data bank at Fort Holabird were found unnecessary and were
destroyed, along with other related records.

One copy of all the material

relevant to the instant suit was retained, however, because of the pendency of
this litigation.

The review leading to the destruction of these records was said at

the time the district court ruled on petitioners' motion to dismiss to be a
"continuing" one (App. at 82), and the Army's policies at that

tin:~

were re-

presented as follows in a letter from the Under Secretary of the Army to
Senator Sam J. Ervin, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional
Rights:
"[R]eports concerning civil disturbances will be limited to
matters of immediate concern to the Army -- that is, reports concerning outbreaks of violence or incidents with
a high potential for violence beyond the capability of state
and local police and the National Guard :.o control. These
reports will be collected by liaison with other Government
agencies and reported by teletype to the Intelligence Command. They will not be placed in a computer • . . • These
reports are destroyed 60 days after publication or 60 days
after the end of the disturbance. This limited reporting
system will ensure that the Army is prepared to respond to
whatever directions the President may is sue in civil disturbanc e situations and without watching lawful activities of
civilians. 11 (App. at 80)

.•

'r:'•'

-6In briefs for petitbners filed with this Court, the Solicitor General
has called our attention to certain directives issued by the Army and the
Department of Defense subsequent to the District Court's dismissal of the
action; these directives indicate that the Army's review of thk needs of its

domestic intelligence activities has indeed been a continuing

o~e and that

·..

those activities have since been significantly reduced.
( 2)

The Us trict Court held a combined hearing on respondents 1 motion
for a prelim.:_ nary injunction and petitioners' motion for dismis s a 1 and
thereafter announced its holding that respondents had failed to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted.

·.

It was the view of the district court that

respondents failed to allege any action on the part of the Army that was un-

,,

lawful in it s elf and further failed to allege any injury or any realistic threats

'}_/
to their rights growing out of the Army's actions.

3._1
In the course of the oral argument the district judge sought cla rification from respondents' counsel as to the nature of the threats perceived by ; "
respondents; he asked what exactly it was in the Army's activities that tended
to chill respondents and others in the exercise of their constitutional rights.
Counsel responded that it was
"precis ely the threat in this case that in some future civil disorder
of some kind, the Army is going to come in with its list of troublemakers . . . and go rounding up people and putting them in military prisons somewhere." (Emphasis added)
To this the court responded that "we still sit here with the writ of habeas corpus. ''
At another point, counsel for respondents took a somewhat difference approach
in arguing that
"we're not quite sure exactly what they have in mind and that is precis ely what causes the chill, the chilling effect. 11 (Emphasis added.)

•

-7-

I

In reversing, the 0ourt of Appeals noted that respondents "have some

I
dtfficulty in establishing visible injury." They
''freely admit that they complain of no sp_ecific action of the
Army against them . . . . There is no evidence of illegal or
unlawful surveillanc e activities. We are not cited to any
clandestine intrusion by a military agent. So far as io yet
shown, the information gathered is nothing more than a good
newspaper reporter would be able to gather by attendance
at public meetings and the clipping of articles from publications available on any newsstand. 11 444 F. Zd, at 953.

. '

'

..·'

The court tooknote of petitioners' argument "that nothing [detrimental to
respondents] had been done, that nothing is contemplated to be done, and even
if some action by the Army against [respondents] were possibly foreseeable,

.~

such would not present a presently justiciable controversy.'' With respect
to this argument, the Court ofAppeals had this to say:
"This position of the appellees [petitioners] does not accord full
measure to the rather unique argument advanced by appellants
[respondents]. While appellants do indeed argue that in the
future it is possible that information relating to matters far beyond
the responsibilities of the military 1nay be misued by the military
to the detriment of these civilian appellants, yet appellants do
not attempt to establish this as a definitely foreseeable event, or
to base the i r complaint on this ground. Rather, appellants
contend that the present existence of this system of gathering and
distributing information, allegedly far beyond the mission
requirement of the Army, constitutes an impermissible burden on
appellants and other per sons similarly situated which exercises
a present inhibiting effect on their full expression and utilization
of their First Amendment rights . . • • 11 444 F. Zd, at 954.
(Emphasis in original.)

,,:
;

Our examination of the record satisfies us that the court of appeals

/

.....
"
'

'

properly identified the is sue presented, namely, whether the jurisdiction
of a federal court may be invoked by a complainant who alleges that the
exercise of his First Amendment rights is being chilled by the mere existence,
without more, of a governmental investigative and data-gathering activity

~

..
··~

(.

-8that is alleged to be broader in scope than 1s reasonably necessary for the a c-

.

\

complislunent of a valid governmental purpose. We conclude, however, that,
having properly identified the issue, the court of_ appeals decided that issue

4/
incorrectly.
In recent years this Court has found in a number of cases that constitutional violations may arise from the deterrent, or "chilling,

11

effect of

governmental regulations that fall short of a direct prohibition against the
exercise of First Amendment rights.

~,

Baird v. State Bar of Arizona,

401 U . S. 1 (1971); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967);
Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S . 301 (1965); Baggett v. Bullitt,

4/
Indeed, the court of appeals noted that it had reached a different
conclusion when presented with a virtually identical issue in another of its
recently decided cases, Davis v. Ichord, 442 F. 2d 1207 (CA-C. D. 1970).
The plaintiffs in Davis were attacking the constitutionality of the House of
Representatives Rule under which the House Committee on Internal Security
conducts investigations and maintains files described by the plaintiffs as a
11
political blacklist. 11 The court noted that any chilling effect to which the
plaintiffs were subject arose from the mere existence of the Committee and
its files and the mere possibility of the misuse of those files. In affirming
the dismissal of the complaint, the court concluded that allegations of such
a chilling effect could not be elevated to a justiciable claim merely by
alleging as well that the challenged House Rule was overly broad and vague.
In deciding the case presently under review, the court of appeals
distinguished Davis on the ground that the difference in the source of the chill
in the two cases -- a House Committee in Davis and the Army in the instant
case -- was cont:r .o lling. We cannot agree that the jurisdictional question
with which we are here concerned is to be resolved on the basis of the identity
of the parties names as defendants in the complaint.

·l

'·

-9377 U.S. 360 (1964).

In none of these cases, however, did the chilling effect

arise merely from the individual's knowledge that a governmental agency
was engaged in certain activities or from the individual's con\omitant fea.r
that, armed with the fruits of those activities, the agency migJt in the future
take some other and additional action detrimental to that indi1dual.
in each of

thes~

Rather,

cases, the challenged exercise of governmental power was

regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature, and the complainant was
either presently or prospectively subject to the regulations, proscriptions,
or compulsions that he was challenging.
For example, the petitioner in Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, had
·'

been denied admission to the bar solely because of her refusal to answer a

..

'

~·

question regarding the organizations with which she had been ass .o ciated in
the past.

In announcing the judgment of the Court, Mr. Justice Black said

that "a State may not inquire about a man's views or associations solely for
the purpose of withholding a right or benefit because of what he believes.

401 U.S., at 7.

11

Some of the teachers who were the complainants in

,.,··.'
Keyishian v. Board of Regents had been discharged from employment by

\,

the State, and the others were threatened with such discharge, because of
their political acts or as so cia tions.

The Court concluded that the State 1 s
, r ...~

"complicated and intricate scheme" of laws and regulations relating to
teacher loyalty could not withstand constitutional scrutiny; it was not per-

..

,. '
~

I'

missible to inhibit First Amendment expression by forcing a teacher to "guess

·I

what conduct or utterances" might be in violation of that complex regulatory
\

'·

, ... '

,,

'

I
I
scheme
I

-10and might thereby

I

vf Postmaster General

11

los c him his position.

11

385 U.S. , at 604.

Lamont

dealt with a governmental regulation requiring

private individuals to make a special written request to the Post Office for
delivery of each individual mailing of certain kinds of political literature
I

addressed to them.

In declaring the regulation invalid, the Court said:

''The

addressee carries an affirmative obligation which we do not think the Government
may impose on him.

11

381 U.S., at 307.

Baggett v. Bullitt dealt with are-

·.

quirement that an oath of vague and uncertain meaning be taken as a condition
of employment by a governmental agency.

The Court said:

"Those with a

conscientious regard for what they solemnly swear or affirm, sensitive to the
perils posed by the oath's indefinite language, a void the risk of loss of employment, and perhaps profession, only by restricting their conduct to that which
is unquestionably safe.

Free speech may not be so inhibited.

11

377 U.S., at

372.
The decisions in these cases fully recognize that governmental action may
be subject to constitutional chall e nge even though it has only an indirect effect
on the exercise of First Amend1nent rights.

At the same time, however, these

decisions have in no way eroded the
"established principle that to entitle a private individual to invoke
the judicia 1 power to determine the validity of executive or legislative action he must show that he has sustained or is immediately
in danger of sustaining a direct injury as the result of that action
• . • . " Ex Parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937).
The respondents do not meet this test; their claim, simply stated, is that
they disagree with the judgments made by the Executive branch with respect

.

'

-11to the type and amount of information the Army needs

and that the very

.

.

existence of the Army's data-gathering system produces a constitutionally

'•

impermissible chilling effect upon the exercise of their First Amendment
rights.

That alleged "chilling" effect may perhaps be seen as arising from

respondents' very perception of the system as inappropriate to the Army's
role under our form of government, or as arising from respondents' beliefs
that it is inherently dangerous for the military to be concerned with activities
in the civilian sector, or as arising from respondents' less generalized yet
speculative apprehensiveness that the Army may at some future date misuse

ljj
the information in some way that would cause direct harm to respondents.

··,

Allegations of a subjective "chill" are not an adequate substitute for a claim
of specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future

~arm;

"the

federal courts established pursuant to Article III of the Constitution do not
render advisory opinions." United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75,

..

89 (1947).
·'

lj_/
Not only have respondents left somewhat unclear the precise connection
between the mere existence of the challenged system and their own alleged chill,
but they have also cast considerable doubt on whether they themselves are in
fact suffering from any such chill. Judge MacKinnon took cogent note of this
difficulty in dissenting from the court of appeals' judgment, rendered as it was
"on the facts of the case which emerge from the pleadings, affidavits and the
admissions made to the trial court.'' 444 F.2d, at 959. At the oral argument
before the district court, counsel for resporrl ents admitted that his clients
were "not people, obviously, who are cowed and chilled"; indeed, they were
quite willing "to open them.selves up to public investigation and public scrutiny. 11
But, counsel argued, these respondents must "represent millions of Americans
not nearly as forward [and] courageous" as themselves. It was Judge M.acKinnon 1 s
view that this concession "constitutes a basic denial of practically their whole
case. 11 Id. Even assuming a justiciable controversy, if respondents themselves
are not chilled, but seek only to represent those "millions 11 whom they believe
are so chilled, respondents clearly lack that "personal stake in the outcome
of the controversy" essential to standing. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204
(footnote continued)

'·'

..

..

.

..,.,·

'·
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,

'i_/

.•. ,"

(footnote cont 'd)

1~7

v. Irvis,
(1962). As the Court recently observed in Moose Lodge No . .
- - - - - - - - - ' a litigant "has standing to se e k redress for ~njuries done
to him, but may not seek redress for injuries done to others. •I

..
•.I'

-12Stripped to its essentials, what respondents appear to be seeking is
a broad scale investigation, conducted by themselves as private parties armed
with the subpoena power of a federal district court and the power of eros sexamination to probe into the Army's intelligence-gathering acf ivities, with
the District Court determining at the conclusion of that investigation the extent
to which tho s e activities may or may not be appropriate to the Army's mission.
The following excerpt from the opinion of the Court of Appeals suggests the

·'

broad sweep implicit in its holding.
"Apparently in the judgment of the civilian head of the Army not
everything being done in the operation of this intelligence system
was necessary to the performance of the military mission. I£
the Secretary of the Army can formulate and implement such
judgment based on facts within his Departmental knowledge, the
United States District Court can hear evidence, ascertain the
facts, and decide what, if any further restrictions on the .c omplained-of activities are called for to confine the military to
their legitimate sphere of activity and to protect appellants'
allegedly infringed constitutional rights." 444 F. 2d 947, 958.
This, in effect, asserts that ''if the Executive can do it, courts can review it" --

·'

..·'·

a concept alien to the idea of co-equal branches absent specific present
injury rather than a speculative future injury.

..

This approach would have the
'.

federal. courts as virtually continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness
of Executive action;

such a role is appropriate for the Congress acting through

its committees and the" power of the purse''; it is not the role of the judiciary.

..
...

',.;; .,,..

We, of course, intimate no view with respect to the propriety or
desirability, from a policy standpoint, of the challenged activities of the Department of the Army; our conclusion is a narrow one, namely, that on this

·.

record the respondents have not presented a case for resolution by the courts.

'·

l:··.
~:'"),•

·,

-13...
The concern of the Executive and Legislative branches in response
tol disclosure of the Army surveillance activities -- and indeed the claims
alleged in the

complai r!~

--reflects a traditional and strong resistance of

I

:

Americans to any military intrusion into civilian affairs.

That tradition

has deep roots in our history and found early expression, for example, in
I

I
the Third Amendment 1 s explicit prohibition against quartering soldiers in
I

private homes without consent and in the constitutional provisions for
civilian control of the military.

Those prohibitions are not directly pre-

sented by this case, but their philosophical underpinnings explain our traditional insistence on limitations on military operations in peacetime.
Indeed, when presented with claims of judicially cognizable injury resulting
from military intrusion into the civilian sector, federal courts ar.e fully
empowered to consider claims of those asserting such injury; there is
nothing in our Nation 1 s history or in this Court 1 s decided cases, including
our holding tocJ ay, that can properly be seen as giving any indication that
actual or threatened injury by reason of unlawful activities of the military
would go unnoticed or unremedied.
Reversed.

'·
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MEMO TO JUSTICE POWELL
Re: No. 71-288, Laird v. Tatum
The Chief's third draft, circulated yesterday, finally
characterizes the complaint in this case accurately.

It says

that the issue is "whether the jurisdiction of a federal court
may be invoked by a complainant who alleges that the exercise
of his F irst Amendment rights is being chilled by the mere
existence, without more, of a governmental investigative and
data-gathering activity that is alleged to be broader in
scope than is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of
a valid governmental purpose."
in only one minor aspecto

I would quibble with that statement

I think it is important that the

investigative and data- gathering activity is being conducted
by the Army because the Army has far greater poweres than
other governmental a ge n cies and because this country has a
strong tradition of keeping the Army out of civilian affairs.
I think it should also be added that the complaint does not
just a l lege that this activity is broader than is reasonably
necessary to fulfill a valid purpose;
\ activity is illegal.

i~lleg~his

You will recall that Sen. Ervin discussed

this alleged illegality almost exclusively in his oral argument.
Cl

The Chief rejects the justi-..ability of this issue because
he says the chilling effect is too speculative when applied to
these particular litigants.

He really says no more than that.

He then attempts to distinguish other cases in which the Court
has struck down governmental activity because of its chilling
effect. Presumably in these cases the chilling effect is not
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merely speculative.

But that is really not a means of distinguishing

those cases for in each case there was a hearing on the merits
in which actual evidence of what the government was doing and
its effect or potential effect was put into the record.
Naturally the injury in those cases was less speculative after
a full hearing had been held than it is in this case in which
the government has not even filed an answer.

The question is,

however, whether the complaints in those cases were less
speculative.

I don't propose to treat all four cases that the

Chief cites but only two of them and one more which he ignores.
~et

v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964), was an action

brought by several teachers who opposed swearing a loyalty

-

oath required by the state of Washington.

---

Despite the fact

that the oath had been required since 1931 with apparently

no oppressive effects the Court struck it down. Its vice
as to
was that it was vague/±R what groups teachers had to swear they
would not associate with and as to what ideas teachers had to
swear they would not teach or advocate.

Mr. Justice White

writing for the majority said:
"The uncertain meanings of the oaths require the oathtaker--teachers and public servants--to steer 'far wider
of the unlawful zone,' • • • than if the boundaries of
the forbidden areas were clearly marked. Those with a
conscientious regard for what they solemnly swear or
affirm, sensitive to the perils posed by the oath's
indefinite language, avoid the riske of loss of employment, and perhaps profession, only by restricting their
conduct to that which is unquestionably safe. Free
speech may not be so inhibited."
When the 64 teachers who brought the class action in Bagget
alleged that the oath was vague and might chll the exercise
of their First Amendment rights in the manner Justice White
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described, the injury they were alleg ing was just as speculative
as the injury alleged in this case.
that the case was justiciable.

Yet there is no question

No one was required to actually

prove that he had been fired or otherwise punished because
of the oath and his enga g ing in First Amendment activities.
The mere existence of the oath itself was sufficient . to allow
the teachers to sue and to require the government to offer
a justification.

I submit the case cannot be distinguished,
~

"""'--

.....

and I see nothing in the Chief's treatment on page 10 to
distinguish it.
Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381
a federal law whereby the
they

~e g arded

~ost

u.s.

301 (1965), concerned

Office would hold up mail which

as Communist political propaganda and send the

addressee a card.

If he retyrned the card, thereby indicating

that he wanted to recieve the mail, it was sent to him.

The

two appellants in the case sued the govenment instead of
returning the cards.

Theft~ claim was that the requirment of

sending a card, thereby indicating that they wanted to recieve
Communist political propaganda, might indentify them to the
government and mi ght have repercussions, similar to those
feared by resps in this case.

They made no showing that there

were such repercussions a gainst anyone else so that the chilling
effect on their First Amendment right to recieve written materials
could be said to be more than speculative.

Nevertheless, there

was no question that their claim was not only justiciable
but that they could prevail on the merits
more.

witho~showing

Mr. Justice Doug las, writing for the Court, said:

any

-4"We rest on the narrow ground that the addressee in order J/
to receive h is mail must request in writing that it be
delivered. Tlis amounts in our jtld gment to an unconstitutional abrid gment of the addressee's F irst Amendment
rights. The addressee carries an affirmative obligation
which whe do not think the Government may impose on him,
This requirement is almost certain to have a deterrent
effect, especially as respects those who have sensitive .
positions. Their livelihood may be dependent on a security
clearance. Public official s, like schoolteachers who have
no tenure, might think they would invite disaster if the
read what the Federal Government says contains the seeds
of treason. Apart from them, any addressee is likely
to feel some inhibition in sending for literature which
federal officilas have condemned as 'communist political
propaganda."
The Chief distinguishes Lamont by citing the "affirmative
obligation" language set out above.
out of context.

But surely that is taken

There is nothing wrong with placing an affirmative

obligation on citizens.

If for example eve ryone who received

foreign mail had to send in a card, the case ¥Jould have been
completely different.

What was wrong wxx the government's

having a way to identify persons who engaged in certain activities
that had a poltical tinge disapproved by the majority of people
in this country.

Surely the result in Lamont would have been

no different if the government simply made a list of all persoqs '
receiving "communits political propaganda" and then forwarded
it on automaticallly.

Therefore, the complaint in Lamo!l!_,

which is the relative comparison, could not possibly have
alleged any chilling ef f ect less specul ative than the chilling
effect alle ged here.
Final ly, I want to turn to Justice Harlan's opinion for a
unanimous Court in NAACP

Yi_Alab~,

357 U.S. 449 (1958), a

case which the Chief does not discuss.

That case concerned

an order by an Alabama court to the local chapter of the NAACP

-5That order resulted in
--contempt citation when the NAACP refused to comply. Before

to produce a list of its membership.
(

a

the Court, the NAACP raised the F irst Amendment rights of its
members in defense to the contempt citation .

The first important

thing to note about the case is that the Court ruled that
the NAACP had standing to raise the First Amendment rights of
its members.
"We think that petitioner argues more appropriately the
rights of its members, and that its nexus with them is
sufficient to permit that it act as their representative
before this Court. In so concluding , we reject respondent's
argument that the Association lacks standing to assert
here constitutional rights pertaining to the members,
who are not of course parties to the litigation."
This was done because (1) the members claimed they had a right
to remain

ano~ymous,

and making them assert their rights would

of course destroy anopymaty and (2) because the result of
discloure mi ght chil l membership in the Association and thus
wou l d have an adverse effect on it .

I t is important to note

this aspect of the case because some of the plaintiffs in this
litigation are organizations.

I f there is a chilling effect,

they should be able to assert in on behalf of their members
since they are affected if participation in their meetings and
rallies is diminished by government surveillance.

Secondly,

in a footnote, the Chief quotes the dissent below to the effect
that these litigants are not chilled because they have asserted
their rights.

But in some cases, the organizations are asserting

t he rights of their members who may very well be chilled--as
is alleged--from asserting the rights as individuals.

Third,

this seems to me to contradict the Chief's assertion that a
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litigant cannot ever assert the ri ghts of another.

This is

of course true as a generality, but not in the area of the
F irst Amendment ast Justice Harlan's opinion demonstrates
and as the overbreadth doctrine, recently applied in Gooding
v. Wil son, also demonstrates.
The second thing about this case that should be noted is
that the complaint a gain alle ges that mereJy
names of its members to the state

b~

NNNX~xxkxxx

revealing the

mi ght chill the

exercise of F irst Amendment rights.
" It is hardly a novel perception that compelled disclosure
of affiliation with groups engaged ina dvocacy may constitute
as effective a restraint on freedom of association as the
forms of governmental action in the cases above were thought
likely to produce upon the particular constitutional
rights there involved. This Court has reco gnized the
vital relationship between freedom to associate and privacy
in one's association."
Thus it would seem that the complaint in

~AACP v~ _Al~Qama,

about which there was no question as to justidicability, must
also have alle ged a chilling effect from governmental acquisition
of knowled ge as to membership.
It should be kept in mind that a ruling that this complaiptr
wxx is justiciable would not lead to a ruling that there was
in fact a chilling effect.

Tha~

must be proven, and it may

well be that it cannot be proven in this case.

Even if it

is proven, it may not be sufficent to overide the governmental
interest in surveillance.

Thus, in NAACP

v.!._.!~1?b9:,!lla

, the

chilling effect was found to outweigh the governmental interest
after strong proof of its existence:
" Petitioner has madean uncontrove:rted $hewing that on
past occassions revelation of the ~dent~ty of its rank-
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and-file members has exposed these members to economic
reprisal , loss of em~loyment, th~eat of.p~ysical coercion,
and other manifestat~ons of publ~c host~l~ty. Under these
circumstances, we think it apparent that compelled disclosure
of petitironer's Alabama membership is likely to affect
adversey the ability of petitioner and its members to
pursue their collective effort to foster beliefs which
they admittely have the ri ght to advocate, in that it
may induce members to withdraw from the Association and
dissuade others from joining it because of fear of exposure
of their beliefs shown through their as s ociations and of
the consequences of this exposure."
It may be that no such showing can be made in this case, but
the point is that such showings of chill ing·•effect are to be
proven at trial; they are not requirroto be shown before a
trial can be held.
The Chief's opinion does not i gnore the fact that there are
cases in which a chilling effect has been a sufficient injury
to not only permit a suit but to bring relief.

He distinguishes

all these cas~s in general by saying that "[i]n none of these
cases, however, did the chilling effect arise merely from the
individual's knowledge that a governmental a gency was engaged
in certain activities or from the individual's concomitant
fear that, armed with the fruits of those activites, the agency . .
might in the future take some Qther and additional action
detrimental to that individual." I do not think that statement
is accurate.

Surely that is precisely the x±x evil pointed

out in these cases, particularly in Lamont where the chilling
effect arose entirely out of the government's knowledge of
who was receiveing Communist propaganda without any proof that
the government misused that knowledge.
The Chief goes on to . say that in all these cases the
chal lenged exercise of governmental power was "regulatory,
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proscripitive, or compulsory in nature, and the complaintant
was either presently or prospectively subject to the re gulations,
proscripitions, or compulsions that he was challeng ing ."

He

does not indicate any reason why that makes a difference insofar
as standing is concerned.

Moroever, I am not even sure the

distincition is accurate.

Perhaps it is regulatory, proscriptive,

or compulsory to require an affirmative statement of a desire
to receive mail or to compel the disclosure of membership,
but I am hardpressed to say which it is.

But more importantly

the evil in those cases was a result of the government's
acquisition of information, and that is the same alleged evil
in this case.

Every case is different in some way or at some

level, but I can see no distinction that is principled which
removes this case from the large body of precedent that has
reco gnized the existence of ? justiciable issue when it is
alle ged that governmental activity has a chilling effect on
the exercise of First Amendment rights and that that e:fi:e
activity is either illegal or insubstantial when compared to
the chilling effect.

That is precisely what the complaint in

this case alleges.
Fox

2nd DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 71-288

Melvin R. Laird, Secretary
On Writ of Certiorari to the
of Defense, et al.,
United States Court of
Petitioners,
Appeals
for the District of
V.
Columbia Circuit.
Arlo Tatum et al.
[October -, 1972]
Memora.ndum of MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST.
Respondents in this case have moved that I disqualify
myself from participation. While neither the Court nor
any Justice individually appears ever to have done so,
I have determined that it would be appropriate for me
to state the reasons which have led to my decision with
respect to respondents' motion. In so doing, I do not
wish to suggest that I believe such a course would be
desirable or even appropriate in any but the peculiar
circumstances present here. 1
Respondents contend that because of testimony which
I gave on behalf of the Department of Justice before
the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate at its
1 In a motion of this kind, there is not apt to be anything akin to
the "record" which supplies the factual basis for adjudication in
most litigated matters. The judge will presumably know more
about the factual background of his involvement in matters which
form the basis of the motion thnn do the movants, but with the
passage of any time at all his recollection will fade except to the
extent it is refreshed by transcripts such as those available here.
If the motion before me turned only on disputed factual inferences,
no purpose would be served by my detailing my own recollection of
the relevant facts. Since, howeYer, the main thru~t of respondents'
motion is based on what seemH to me an incorrect interpretation of
the applicable statute, I believe that this is the exceptional case
where an opinion is warranted.

71-288-MEMO
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hearings on "Federal Data Banks, Computers and the
Bill of Rights," and because of other statements I made
in speeches related to this general subject, I should have
disqualified myself from participating in the Court's
consideration or decision of this case. The governing
statute is 28 U. S. C. ~ 455 which provides:
"Any Justice or judge of the United States shall
disqualify himself in any case in which he has a
substantial interest, has been of counsel, is or has
been a material witness, or is so related to or connected with any party or his attorney as to render
it improper, in his opinion, for him to sit on the
trial, or appeal, or other proceeding therein."
Respondents also cite various draft provisions of
Standards of J uclicial Conduct prepared by a distinguished
committee of the American Bar Association, and adopted
by that body at its recent annual meeting. Since I do
not read these particular provisions as being materially
different from the standards enunciated in the congressional statute, there is no occasion for me to give them
separate consideration.~
Respondents in their motions summarize their factual
contentions as follows:
"Under the circumstances of the instant case, Mn..
JusTICE REHNQUIST's impartiality is clearly questionable because of his appearance as an expert witness for the Justice Department and Senate hearings
inquiring into the subject matter of the case, because of his intimate knowledge of the evidence
underlying the respondents' allegations, and because
of his public statements about the lack of merit in
respondents' claims."
2 Sre Executive Hrport No. 91-92, 9bt Cong.,
tion of Clrmenl F. lbyn;;worth, .Jr., pp. 10-11.

1~t
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Respondents are substantially correct in characterizing
my appearance before the Ervin Subcommittee as an
"expert witness for the Justice Department" on the subject of statutory and constitutional law dealing "·ith
the authority of the Executive Branch to gather information. They are also correct in stating that during the
course of my testimony at that hearing, and on other
occasions, I expressed an understanding of the law, as
established by decided cases of this Court and of other
courts, which "·as contrary to the contentions of respondents in this case.
Respondents' reference, ho,Yever, to my "intimate
knowledge of the evidence underlying the respondents'
allegations" seems to me to make a great deal of very
little. When one of the Cabinet departments of the
Executive Branch is requested to supply a witness for
the congressional committee hearing devoted to a particular subject, it is generally confronted with a. minor
dilemma. If it is to send a witness with personal knowledge of every phase of the inquiry, there will be not one
spokesman but a dozen. If it is to send one spokesman
to testify as to the Department's position with respect
to the matter under inquiry, that spokesman will frequently be called upon to deal not only with matters
within his own particular baili"·ick in the Department,
but with those in other areas of the Department with
respect to which his familiarity may be slight. I commen ted on this fact in my testimony before Senator
Ervin's Subcommittee:
"As you might imagine, the Justice Department, in
selecting a witness to respond to your inquiries, had
to pick someone who did not have personal knowledge in every field. So I can simply give you my
understanding . . . . " Hearings, p. 619.

71-288-MEl\10
4

LAIRD v. TATUM

There is one reference to the case of Taturn v. Laird
in my prepared statement to the Subcommittee, and one
reference to it in my subsequent appearance during a
colloquy with Senator Ervin. The former appears as
follows in the reported hearings:
"However, in connection with the case of Tatum v.
Laird, now pending in the U. S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit, one print-out
from the Army computer has been retained for the
inspection of the court. It will thereafter be
destroyed."
The second comment respecting the case was in a discussion of the applicable law with Senator Ervin, the·
chairman of the Subcommittee, during my second
appearance.
My recollection is that the first time I learned of
the existence of the case of Laird v. Tatum, other than
having probably seen press accounts of it, was at the·
time I was preparing to testify as a witness before the·
Subcommittee in March 1971. I believe the case was
then being appealed to the Court of Appeals by respondents. The Office of the Deputy Attorney General,
which is customarily responsible for collecting material
from the various divisions to be used in preparing the
Departm e1r"s statement, advised me or one of my staff
as to the arrangement with respect to the computer
print-out from the Army Data Bank, and it was incor-·
porated into the prepared statement which I read to
the Subcommittee. I had then and have now no personal knowledge of the arrangement, nor so far as I
know have I ever seen or been apprised of the contents
of this particular print-out. Since the print-out had
been lodged with the Justice Department by the Department of the Army, I later authorized its transmittal
to the staff of the subcommittee at the request of the·
latter.
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At the request of Senator Hruska, one of the members
of the Subcommittee, I supervised the preparation of a
memorandum of law ·which the record of the hearings
indicates was filed on September 20, 1971. Respondents.
refer to it in their petition, but no copy is attached, and
the hearing records do not contain a copy. I \Yould
expect such a memorandum to have commented on the
decision of the Court of Appeals in Laird v. Tatum,
treating it along with other applicable precedents in
attempting to state \Yhat the Department thought the
law to be in this general area.
Finally, I never participated, either of record or in
any advisory capacity, in the District Court, in the
Court of Appeals, or in this Court, in the government's
conduct of the case of Laird v. Tatum.
Respondents in their motion do not explicitly relate
their factual contentions to the applicable provisions of
28 U. S. C. § 455. The so-called "mandatory" provisions of that section require disqualification of a Justice
or judge "in any case in which he has a substantial
interest, has been of counsel, [or] is a material
witness . . . . "
Since I have neither been of counsel nor have I been
a material witness in Laird v. Tatum, these provisions
are not applicable. Respondents refer to a memorandum prepared in the Office of Legal Counsel for the
benefit of MR. JusTICE WHITE shortly before he came
on the Court, relating to disqualification. I reviewed
it at the time of my confirmation hearings and found
myself in substantial agreement with it. Its principal
thrust is that a Justice Department official is disqualified
if he either signs a pleading or brief or "if he actively
participated in any case even though he did not sign a
pleading or brief." I agree: In both United Stales v.
District Court,- U. S . - (1972), for which I was not
officially responsible in the Department but with respect

·.
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to which I assisted in drafting the brief, and in S & E
Contractors v. United States, U. S. (1972), in
which I had only an advisory role which terminated immediately prior to the commencement of the litigation,
I disqualified myself. Since I did not have even an advisory role in the conduct of the case of Laird Y. Tatum,
the application of such a rule would not require or authorize disqualification here.
This leaves remaining the so-called discretionary portion of the section, requiring disqualification where the
judge "is so related to or connected with any party or
his attorney as to render it improper, in his opinion, for
him to sit on the trial, appeal, or other proceeding
therein." The interpretation and application of this section by the various Justices who have sa.t on this Court
seem to have varied widely. The leading commentator
on the subject is John P. Frank, whose two articles, Disqualification of Judges, 56 Yale Law Journal605 (1947),
and Disqualification of Judges: In Support of the Bayh
Bill, 35 Law and Contemporary Problems 43 (1970),
contain the principal commentary on the subject. For
a Justice of this Court who has come from the Justice
Department, Mr. Frank explains disqualification practices as follows:
"Other relationships between the Court and the Department of Justice, however, might well be different. The Department's problem is special because
it is the largest law office in the world and has cases
by the hundreds of thousands and lawyers by the
thousands. For the most part, the relationship of
the Attorney General to most of those matters is
purely formal. As between the Assistant Attorneys
General for the various departmental divisions,
there is almost no connection." Frank, supra, 35Law & Contemporary Problems, at 47.
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Indeed, different Justices who have come from the Department of Justice have treated the same or very
similar situations differently.
In Schneiderman v.
United States, 320 U. S. 118 (1943), a case brought and
tried during the time Mr. Justice Murphy was Attorney
General, but defended on appeal during the time that
Mr. Justice Jackson was Attorney General, the latter
disqualified himself but the former did not. 320 U. S.,
at 207.
I have no hesitation in concluding that my tota.l lack
of connection while in the Depa.rtment of Justice \Yith
the defense of the case of Laird v. Tatum does not
suggest discretionary disqualification here because of my
previous relationship with the Justice Department.
However, respondents also contend that I should disqualify myself because I have previously expressed in
public an umlerstanding of the ]a w on the question of the
constitutionality of governmental surveillance. While
no provision of the statute sets out such a provision for
disqualification in so many words. it could conceivably
be embraced "·ithin the general language of the discretionary clause. Such a contention raises rather squarely
the question of whether a member of this Comt, who
prior to his taking that office has expressed a public
view as to what the law is or ought to be, should later
sit as a judge in a case raising that particular questiou.
The present disqualification statute applying to Justices
of the Supreme Court has been on the books only since
1948, but its predecessor, applying by its terms only to
district court judges, was enacted in 1911. Chief Justice
Stone, testifying before the Judiciary Committee in
1943, stated:
"And it has always seemed to the Court that when
a district judge could not sit in a case because of
his previous association with it, or a. circuit court

•,

·.

'J
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of appeals judge, it was our manifest duty to take
the same position." Hearings Before Committee
on the Judiciary on H. R. 2808, 78th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1943), quoted in Frank, supra, 56 Yale Law Journal, at 612.
My impression is that none of the former Justices of
this Court since 1911 have followed a practice of disqualifying themselves in cases involving points of law
with respect to which they had expressed an opinion or
formulated policy prior to ascending to the bench.
Mr. Justice Black while in the Senate was one of the
principal authors of the Fair Labor Standards Act;
indeed, it is cited in the 1970 edition of the United
States Code as the "Black-Connery Fair Labor Standards Act." Not only did he introduce one of the early
versions of the Act, but as Chairman of the Senate
Labor and Education Committee he presided over·
lengthy hearings on the subject of the bill and presented the favorable report of that Committee to the
Senate. See S. Rep. No. 884, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1937). Nonetheless, he sat in the case which upheld
the constitutionality of that Act, United States v. Darby,
312 U. S. 100 (1941), and in later cases construing it,.
including Jewel Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local 6167, UMW,
325 U. S. 161 (1945). In the latter case, a petition for
rehearing requested that he disqualify himself because
one of his former law partners argued the case, and
Justices Jackson and Frankfurter may be said to have
implicitly criticized him for failing to do so. 3 But to
my knowledge his Senate role with respect to the Act
was never a source of criticism for his participation in the
above cases.
Justice Frankfurter had, prior to coming to this Court,
written extensively in the field of labor law. "The Labor
3

See denial of petition for rphcnring in Jewel Ridge Coal Co1·p.

v. Local6167, UMW, 325 U.S. 897 (l9..J.5) (.Jaekson, J., concmTing) ..

.•
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Injunction" which he and Nathan Green co-authored was
considered a classical critique of the abuses by the federal courts of their equitable jurisdiction in the area of
labor relations. Professor Sanford H. Kadish has stated:
"The book \\"aS in no sense a disinterested inquiry.
Its authors' commitment to the judgment that the
labor injunction should be neutralized as a legal
weapon against unions gives the book its energy and
direction. It is, then, a brief, even a 'downright
brief' as a critical reviewer would have it." Kadish,
Labor and the Law, in Felix Frankfurter The Judge
165 (W. Mendelson eel. 1964).
Justice Frankfurter had not only publicly expressed his
views, but had when a law professor played an important,
perhaps dominant, part in the drafting of the NorrisLaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70, 29 U. S. C. §§ 101-115. This
Act was designed by its proponents to correct the abusive
use by the federal courts of their injunctive powers in
labor disputes. Yet in addition to sitting in one of the
leading cases interpreting the scope of the Act, United
States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941), Justice Frankfurter wrote the Court's opinion.
Justice Jackson in McGrath v. Christensen, 340 U. S.
162 ( 1950), participated in a case raising exactly the
same issue which he had decided as Attorney General (in
a way opposite to that in which the Court decided it).
340 U. S., at 176. Mr. Frank notes that Chief Justice
Vinson, who had been active in drafting and preparing
tax legislation while a member of the House of Representatives, never hesitated to sit in cases involving that
legislation when he was Chief Justice.
Two years before he was appointed Chief Justice of
this Court, Charles Evans Hughes wrote a book entitled
The Supreme Court of the United States (Columbia
University Press, 1928). In a chapter entitled "Liberty,
Property, and Social Justice" he discussed at some length

.·
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the doctrine expounded in the case of Adkins v. Children 's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525 ( 1922). I think that one
would be warranted in saying that he implied some
reservations about the holding of that case. See pp.
205, 209-211. Nine years later, Chief Justice Hughes
authored the Court's opinion in TV est Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 (1037), in which a closely divided
Court overruled .Adkins. I have never heard any suggestion that because of his discussion of the subject in
his book he should have rerused himself.
Mr. Frank summarizes his view of Supreme Court
practice as to disqualification in the following words:
"In short, Supreme Court Justices disqualify when
they have a dollar interest; when they are related
to a party and more recently, when they are related
to counsel; and when the particular matter was in
one of their former law offices during their association; or, when in the government, they dealt with
the precise matter and particularly with the precise
case; otherwise, generally no." Frank, supra, 35
Law & Contemporary Problems, at 50.
Not only is the sort of public statement disqualification upon " ·hich respondents rely not covered by the
terms of the applicable statute, then, but it does not
appear to me to be supported by the practice of previous
J usticos of this Court. Since there is little con trolling
authority on the subject, and since under the existing
practice of the Court disqualification has been a matter
of individual decision , I suppose that one who felt very
strongly that public statcmen t disqualification is a highly
desirable thing might find a 'va.y to road it into the
discretionary portion of the statute by implication. I
find little to commend tho concept on its merits, ho\\·ever,
and I am, therefore, not disposed to construe the statutory language to embrace it.
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I do not doubt that a litigant in the position of
respondents would much prefer to argue his case before a Court none of whose members had expressed
the viev.'s that I expressed about the relationship between surveillance and First Amendment rights while
serving as an Assistant Attorney General. I would
think it likewise true that counsel for Darby would
have preferred not to have to argue before Mr. Justice
Black; that counsel for Christensen would have preferred not to argue before Mr. Justice Jackson; ·1 that
coullsel for the United States would have preferred not
to argue before Mr. J ustico Frankfurter; and that counsel
for \Vest Coast Hotel Co. ''"ould have preferred a Court
which dicl not include Chief Justice Hughes.
The Term of this Court just past bears eloquent witness to tho fact that the Justices of this Court, each
seeking to resolve close and difficult questions of constitutional interpretation, do not reach identical results.
The differences must be at least i11 some part due to
differing jurisprudentia] or philosophica 1 propensities.
Mrc JusTICE DouGLAS' statement about federal district judges in his dissenting opinion in Chandler v. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74, 137 (1970), strikes me as being
equally true of the Justices of this Court:

"Judges are not fungible; they cover the constitutional spectrmn; and a particular j udgc's emphasis
may make a "·orld of difference when it comes to
rulings on evidence, the temper of the courtroom,
the tolerance for the profferred defense, and the
like. Lawyers recognize this when they talk about
4
The fact that Mr. Ju~ticc Jackson reversed his earlier opinion
a.fler sitting in Clu·istensen doc~ not seem to me to hear on tho
disqualification issue. A judge will u~ually br requireu to make
any decision as to di::;qualifica.tion before reachinp; any detcrminat ioll
as to how he will vote if he doc.~ ~it.
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'shopping' for a judge; Senators recognize this when
they are asked to give their 'advice a.nd consent'
to judicial appointments; laymen recognize this
when they appraise the quality and image of the
judiciary in their own community."
Since most Justices come to this bench no earlier than
their middle years, it would be unusual if they had not
by that time formulated at least some tentative notions
which would influence them in their interpretation of
the sweeping clauses of the Constitution and their interaction with one another. It would be not merely unusual, but extraordinarv, if thev had not at least ~iven
opinions as to constitution~! issues in their previous
legal careers. Proof that a. J11stice's mind at the time
he .ioined the Court w~s 11. comnlete tabula rasa in the
area of com~titutionaJ adiuclir.ntion would be evidence of
lack of ow=~ lifir.a.tion, not lack of bias.
Yet whethf>r theRe opinions have become at all widely
known m11v nPnPnd entirelv on happenstance. With respect to tho~P who come hen• directly from private life,
such comJ'Yl~=>r>+R or oniniom; mQv never have been publicly
utterf>rl. Bnt it. wonlcl h~=> 1Jf'11R11Ftl if those coming from
polir.v J'Yl!>lrin!J' nivi"ionR in thP F.ver.utive Branch, from
the Renpt~=> nr TTon~e of 'R~=>nrpc;f>ntatives. or from positionR in c;+"tP g-overnment, hMl not divulged at least some
hint of t'f-,,;r g-eneral a.nnrol'lr.h t.o public affairs, if not
as to nFtrtil'nlF~r iRRnes of ll'lw. Indeed, the cJean~st case
of all iR thF~t of ll .Tw<tice who comes to this Court from
a lower rm1rt.. and has, while sitting as a judge of the
lower rourt. hRd occasion to pass on an issue which later
comes before this Court. No more compelling example
could be found of a situation in which a Justice had
previously committed himself. Y ct it is not and could
not rationally be suggested that, so long as the cases be·
different, a Justice of this Court should disqualify himself for that reason. Sec, e. g., the opinion of Mr. Jus-

71-288--MEMO
LAIRD v. TATUM

13'

tice Harlan, joining in Lewis v. Manufacturers National
Bank, 364 U. S. 603, 610 (1961).
Mr. Frank sums the matter up this way:
"Supreme Court Justices are strong minded men,.
and on the general subject matters which come before them, they do have propensities; the course of
decision cannot be accounted for in any other way."
Frank, supra, 35 Law & Contemporary Problems, at
48.
The fact that some aspect of these propensities may
have been publicly articulated prior to coming to this
Court cannot, in my opinion, be regarded as anything
more than a random circumstance which should not by
itself form a basis for disqualification. 5
Based upon the foregoing analysis, I conclude that
the applicable statute does not warrant my disqualification in this case. Having so said, I would certainly
concede that fair minded judges might disagree about the
matter. If all doubts were to be resolved in favor of disqualification, it may be that I should disqualify myself
simply because I do regard the question as a fairly debatable one, even though upon analysis I would resolve
it in favor of sitting.
Here again, one's course of action may well depend
upon the view he takes of the process of disqualification.
Those federal courts of appeals which have considered
the matter have unanimously concluded that a federal
judge has a duty to sit where not disqualified which is.
5 In terms of propriet~·. rather than disqualification, I would
distinguish quite sharrll~· between a public statement made prior
to nomination for the bench, on the one hnnd, and a public statement made by a nominee to the bench. For the latter to express
any but the most gem•ral observation about the law would suggest that, in order to obtain fayorable con::;idrration of hi~ nomination, hr deliberatel.v was announcing in aclvanre, without benefit of
jnclirinl oath, briefs, or argument, how he would deride a particular question that might come before him as a judge.

,,
t.
•,
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equally as strong as the duty to not sit where disqualified. Edwards v. United States, 334 F. 2d 360, 362
(CAS 1964); Tynan v. United States, 376 F. 2d 761
(CADC 1967); In re Union Leader Corporation, 292 F.
2d 381 (CAl 1961); Wolfson v. Palmieri, 396 F. 2d 121
(CA2 1968); Simmons v. United States, 302 F. 2d 71
(CA3 1962); United States v. Hoffa, 382 F. 2d 856
(CA6 1967); Tucker v. Kerner, 186 F. 2d 79 (CA7 1950);
Walker v. Bishop, 408 F. 2d 1378 (CA8 1969). These
cases dealt with disqualification on the part of judges
of the district courts and of the courts of appeals. I think
that the policy in favor of the "equal duty" concept is
even stronger in the case of a Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States. There is no way of substituting Justices on this Court as one judge may be
substituted for another in the district courts. There is
no higher court of appeal which may review an equally
divided decision of this Court and thereby establish the
law for our jurisdiction. See, e. g., Tinker v. Des Moines
School District, 258 F. Supp. 1971, affirmed by an
equally divided court, 383 F. 2d 988 (CA8 1967), certiat·ari granted and judgment reversed, 393 U. S. 503
( 1969). While it can seldom be predicted with confidence at the time that a Justice addresses himself to
the issue of disqualification whether or not the Court
in a particular case will be closely divided, the disqualification of one Justice of this Court raises the possibility
of an affirmance of the judgment below by a11 equal1y
divided Court. The consequence attending such a result
is, of course, that the principle of law presented by the
case is left unsettled. The undesirability of such a. disposition is obviously not a reason for refusing to disqualify oneself where in fact one deems himself disqualified, but I believe it is a reason for not "bending over
backwards" in order to deem one's self disqualified.
The prospect of affirmance by an equally divided
Court, unsatisfactory enough in a single case, presents
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even more serious problems where companion cases
reaching opposite results are heard together here. During the six months in which I ha.ve sat as a Justice of
this Court, there were at least three such instances.G
Since one of tho stated reasons for granting certiorari
is to resolve a conflict among other federal courts or
state courts, the frequency of such instances is not
surpnsmg. Yet affirmance of each of such conflicting
results by an equally divided Court would lay down "one
rule in Athens, and another rule in Rome" "·ith a vengeance. And since the notion of "public statement" disqualification which I understand respondents to advance
appears to have no ascertainable time limit, it is questionable when or if such an unsettled sta.te of the law
could be resolved.
The oath prescribed by 28 U. S. C. § 453 which is
taken by each person upon becoming a member of the
federal judiciary requires that he "administer justice
without respect to persons, and do equal right to the
poor and to the rich," that he "faithfully and impartially
discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon
[him]. . . agreeably to the Constitution and laws of
the United States." Every litigant is entitled to have
his case heard by a judge mindful of this oath. But
neither the oath, the disqualification statute, nor the
practice of the former Justices of this Court guarantee
a litigant that each judge will start off from dead center
in his willingness or ability to reconcile the opposing
arguments of counsel with his understanding of the
Constitution and the law. That being the case, it is
not a ground for disqualification that a judge has prior
to his nomination expressed his then understanding
Branzburg v. II ayes, In re Pappas, and United States v. Caldwell, U. S. (1972). Gelbard v. Uuited Stales and United
U. S . - (1972). Airport A1tthm-ity v. Delta
States v. Egan, Airlines Inc. and Northeast Airli11es Inc. Y. Aeronautics Conmrission, U. S. (1972).
6

'·
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of the meaning of some particular provision of the
Constitution.
Based on the foregoing considerations, I conclude that
respondents' motion that I disqualify myself in this
case should be, and it hereby is, denied.'

·.

7 Petitioners in Gravel v. United States, No. - , 0. T. 1971,
have filed a petition for rehearing which asserts nH one of 1he
grounds that I should have disqualified my;;e!f in that ca.se. Because respondent;;' motion in Laird was addrc~sed to me, and
because it seemed to me to be seriously and respon,«ibly urged, I
have dealt with my reasons for denying it at some !0ngth. Because
I believe that the petition for rehearing in Gravel, insofar as it
deals with disqualification, possesses none of these charactrristics,
thoro is no occasion for me to trea.t it in a similar manner. Since
such motions have in the past been treated by the Court as being
addressed to the individual Justice involved, however, I do venture
the obsen·ation that in my opinion the petition insofar as it relates
to di;;qualification verges on the frivolous. \Vhile my peripheral
ad,·isory role in United States v. New York Times, U. S. (1971), would have warranted disqualification had I been on the
Court when that case was heard, it could not conceivably warrant
disqualification in Gravel, a different case raising entir,ely different
constitutional issues.

2nd DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 71-288
Melvin R. .LaiEQ, Secretary
On Writ of Certiorari to the
of Defense, et al.,
United States Court of
Petitioners,
Appeals
for the District of
v.
Columbia Circuit.
Arlo Tatum et al.
[October -, 1972J
Memorandum of MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST.
Respondents in this case have moved that I disqualify
myself from participation. While neither the Court nor
any Justice individually appears ever to have done so,
I have determined that it would be appropriate for me
to state the reasons which have led to my decision with
respect to respondents' motion. In so doing, I do not
wish to suggest that I believe such a course would be
desirable or even appropriate in any but the peculiar
circumstances present here. 1
Respondents contend that because of testimony which
I gave on behalf of the Department of Justice before
the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate at its
1 In a motion of this kind, there is not apt to be anything akin to·
the "record" which supplies the factual basis for adjudication in
mo t litigated matters. The judge will pre~umably know more
about the factual background of his involvrment in matters which
form the basis of the motion than do thr moYants, but with the
passage of any time at all his recollection will fade except to the
extent it is refreshed by transcripts such as those available here.
If the motion brforc me turned only on eli ·puled factual inferences,
no purpose would be sen·ed by my detailing my own recollection of
the relevant facts . Since, however, the main thrust of respondents'
motion is ba~rcl on what ~rrm~ to mr an incorrrct interpretation of
t.lw applicable statute, I bclicYc thn t thi~ i~ 1he exrepl ional case
where an opinion iH warranted.
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hearings on "Federal Data Banks, Computers and the
Bill of Rights," and because of other statements I made
in speeches related to this general subject, I should have
disqualified myself from participating in the Court's
consideration or decision of this case. The governing
statute is 28 U. S. C. ~ 455 "·hich provides:
"Any Justice or judge of the United States shall
disqualify himself in any case in which he has a
substantial interest, has been of counsel, is or has
been a material witness, or is so related to or connected with any party or his attorney as to render
it improper, in his opinion, for him to sit on the
trial, or appeal, or other proceeding therein."
Respondents also cite various draft provisions of
Standards of Judicial Conduct prepared by a distinguished
committee of the American Bar Association, and adopted
by that body at its recent ammal meeting. Since I do
not read these particular provisions as being materially
different from the standards enunciated in the congressional statute, there is no occasion for me to give them
separate consideration."
Respondents in their motions summarize their factual
contentions as follows:
"Under tho circumstances of the instant case, MR.
JusTICE REHNQUIST's impartiality is clearly questionable because of his appearance as an expert witness for the Justice Department and Senate hearings
inquiring into the subject matter of the case, because of his intimate knowledge of the evidence
underlying the respondents' allegations, and because
of his public statements about the lack of merit in
respondents' claims."
2 Sec Excruti\·e Report. Ko. 91-92, 9bl Cong., bt Sess., Nomination of Clement F. lfaynS\\·orlh, Jr., pp. 10-11.
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Respondents are substantially correct in characterizing
my appearance before the Ervin Subcommittee as an
"expert witness for the Justice Department" on the subject of statutory and constitutional law dealing with
the authority of the Executive Branrh to gather information. They are also correct in stating that during the
course of my testimony at that hearing, and on other
occasions, 1 expressed an understanding of the law, as
established by decided cases of this Court and of other
courts, which "·as contrary to the contentions of respondents in this case.
Respondents' reference, however, to my "intimate
knowledge of the evidence underlying the respondents'
allegations" seems to me to make a great deal of very
little. When one of the Cabinet departments of the
Executive Branch is requested to supply a witness for
the congressional committee hearing devoted to a particular subject, it is generally confronted with a minor
dilemma. If it is to send a "·itness with personal knowledge of every phase of the inquiry, there will be not one
spokesman but a dozen. If it is to send one spokesman
to testify as to the Department's position with respect
to the matter under inquiry, that spokesman will frequently be called upon to deal not only with matters
within his own particular bailiwick in the Department,
but with those in other areas of the Department with
respect to which his familiarity may be slight. I commented on this fact in my testimo11y before Senator
Ervin's Subcommittee:
"As you might imagine, the Justice Department, in
selecting a witness to respond to your inquiries, had
to pick someone who did not have personal knowledge in every field. So I can simply give you my
understanding . . . . " Hearings, p. 619.
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There is one reference to the case of 'l'aturn v. Lairil
in my prepared statement to the Subcommittee, and one
reference to it in my subsequent appearance during a
colloquy with Senator Ervin. The former appears as
follows in the reported hearings:
"However, in connection with the case of Taturn v.
Laird, now pending in the U. S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit, one print-out
from the Army computer has been retained for the
inspection of the court. It will thereafter be
destroyed."
The second comment respecting the case was in a discussion of the applicable law with Senator Ervin, the·
chairman of the Subcommittee, during my second
appearance.
My recollection is that the first time I learned of
the existence of the case of Laird v. Tatum, other than
having probably seen press accounts of it, was at the
time I was preparing to testify as a witness before the
Subcommittee in March 1971. I believe the case was
then being appealed to the Court of Appeals by respondents. The Office of the Deputy Attorney General,
which is customarily responsible for collecting material
from the various divisions to be used in preparing the
Departrnent's statement, advised me or one of my staff
as to the arrangement with respect to the computer
print-out from the Army Data Bank, and it was incorporated into the prepared statement which I read to
the Subcommittee. I had then and have now no personal knowledge of the arrangement, nor so far as I
know have I ever seen or been apprised of the contents
of this particular print-out. Since the print-out had
been lodged with the Justice Department by the Department of the Army, I later authorized its transmittal
to the staff of the subcommittee at the request of the
latter.

.-

"
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At the request of Senator Hruska, one of the members
of the Subcommittee, I supervised the preparation of a
memorandum of law which the record of the hearings
indicates was filed on September 20, 1971. Respondents
refer to it in their petition, but no copy is attached, and
the hearing records do not contain a copy. I would
expect such a memorandum to have commented on the
decision of the Court of Appeals in Laird v. Tatum,
treating it along with other applicable precedents in
attempting to state what the Department thought the
law to be in this general area.
Finally, I never participated, either of record or in
any advisory capacity, in the District Court, in the
Court of Appeals, or in this Court, in the government's
conduct of the case of Laird v. Tatum.
Respondents in their motion do not explicitly relate
their factual contentions to the applicable provisions of
28 U. S. C. § 455. The so-called "mandatory" provisions of that section require disqualification of a Justice
or judge "in any case in which he has a substantial
interest, has been of counsel, [or] is a material
witness . . . . "
Since I have neither been of counsel nor have I been
a material witness in Laird v. Tatum, these provisions
are not applicable. Respondents refer to a memorandum prepared in the Office of Legal Counsel for the
benefit of MR. Jus1'ICE WHITE shortly before he came
on the Court, relating to disqualification. I reviewed
it at the time of my confirmation hearings and found
myself in substantial agreement with it. Its principal
thrust is that a Justice Department official is disqualified
if he either signs a pleading or brief or "if he actively
participated in any case even though he did not sign a
pleading or brief." I agree. In both United States v.
District Court,- U.S.- (1972), for which I was not
officia1ly responsible in the Department but with respect

.•
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to which I assisted in drafting the brief, and in S & E
Contractors v. United States, U. S. (1972), in
which I had only an advisory role which terminated immediately prior to the commencement of the litigation,
I disqualified myself. Since I did not have even an advisory role in the conduct of the case of Laird v. Tatum,
the application of such a rule would not require or authorize disqualification here.
This leaves remaining the so-called discretionary portion of the section, requiring disqualification where the
judge "is so related to or connected with any party or
his attorney as to render it improper, in his opinion, for
him to sit on the trial, appeal, or other proceeding
therein." The interpretation and application of this section by the various Justices who have sat on this Court
seem to have varied widely. Tho leading commentator
on tho subject is John P. Frank, whose two articles, Disqualification of Judges, 56 Yale Law Journal605 (1947),
and Disqualification of Judges: In Support of the Bayh
Bill, 35 Law and Contemporary Problems 43 ( 1970),
contain the principal commentary on the subject. For
a Justice of this Court who has come from the Justice
Department, Mr. Frank explains disqualification practices as follows:
"Other relationships between the Court and tho Department of Justice, however, might well be different. The Department's problem is special because
it is the largest law office in the world and has cases
by the hundreds of thousands and lawyers by the
thousands. For the most part, the relationship of
the Attorney General to most of those matters is
purely formal. As between the Assistant Attorneys
General for the various departmental divisions,
there is almost no connection." Frank, supra, 35·
Law & Contemporary Problems, at 47.
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Indeed, different Justices who ha.ve come from the Department of Justice have treated the same or very
In Schneiderman v.
similar situations differently.
United States, 320 U. S. 118 (1943), a case brought and
tried during the time Mr. Justice Murphy was Attorney
General, but defended on appeal during the time that
Mr. Justice Jackson '"as Attorney General, the latter
disqualified himself but the former did not. 320 U. S.,
at 207.
I have no hesitation in concluding that my total lack
of connection while in the Department of Justice with
the defense of the case of Laird v. Tatum does not
suggest discretionary disqualification here because of my
previous relationship with the Justice Department.
However, respondents also contend that I should disqualify myself because I have previously expressed in
public an understanding of the la\\" on the question of the
constitutionality of governmental surveillance. While
no provision of the statute sets out such a provision for
disqualification in so many words, it could conceivably
be embraced within the general language of the discretionary clause. Such a contention raises rather squarely
the question of whether a member of this Court, who
prior to his taking that office has expressed a public
view as to what the law is or ought to be, should later
sit as a judge in a case raising that particular question.
The present disqualification statute applying to Justices
of the Supreme Court has been on the books only since
1948, but its predecessor, applying by its terms only to
district court judges, was enacted in 1911. Chief Justice
Stone, testifying before the Judiciary Committee in
1943, stated:
"And it has always seemed to the Court that when
a district judge could not sit in a case because of
his previous association with it, or a circuit court

..
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of appeals judge, it was our manifest duty to take·
the same position." Hearings Before Committee
on the Judiciary on H. R. 2808, 78th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1943), quoted in Frank, supra, 56 Yale Law Journal, at 612.
My impression is that none of the former Justices of
this Court since 1911 have followed a practice of disqualifying themselves in cases involving points of law
with respect to which they had expressed an opinion or
formulated policy prior to ascending to the bench.
Mr. Justice Black while in the Senate wa.s one of the
principal authors of the Fair Labor Standards Act;
indeed, it is cited in the 1970 edition of the United
States Code as the "Black-Connery Fair Labor Standards Act." Not only did he introduce one of the early
versions of the Act, but as Chairman of the Senate
Labor and Education Committee he presided over
lengthy hearings on the subject of the bill and presented the favorable report of that Committee to the
Senate. Sec S. Rep. No. 884, 75th Cong., 1st Sess.
( 1937). Nonetheless, he sat in the case which upheld
the constitutionality of that Act, United States v. Darby,
312 U. S. 100 (1941), and in later cases construing it,
including Jewel Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local 6167, UMW,
325 U. S. 161 (1945). In the latter case, a petition for
rehearing requested that he disqualify himself because·
one of his former law partners argued the case, and
Justices Jackson and Frankfurter may be said to have
implicitly criticized him for failing to do so. 3 But to
my knowledge his Senate role with respect to the Act
was never a source of criticism for his participation in the
above cases.
Justice Frankfurter had, prior to coming to this Court,
written extensively in the field of labor Jaw. "The Labor
3 Sco denial of petition for rehe<lring in Jewel Ridge Coal Corp.
v. Local6167, UMW, 325 U.S. 897 (1945) (.Jad:~on, J ., concurrillg).
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Injunction" which he and Nathan Green co-au tho red was
considered a classical critique of the abuses by the federal courts of their equitable jurisdiction in the area of
labor relations. Professor Sanford H. Kadish has stated:
"The book was in no sense n, disinterested inquiry.
Its authors' commitment to the judgment that the
labor injunction should be neutralized as a legal
wen,pon against unions gives the book its energy and
direction. It is, then, a brief, even a 'downright
brief' as a critical reviewer would have it." Kadish,
Labor and the Lav,·, in Felix Frankfurter The Judge
165 (W. Mendelson ed. 1964).
Justice Frankfurter had not only publicly expressed his
views, but had when a law professor played an important,
perhaps dominant, pn,rt in the drafting of the NorrisLaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70, 20 U.S. C. §§ 101- 115. This
Act was designed by its proponents to correct the abusive
use by the federal courts of their injunctive po,vers in
labor disputes. Yet in addition to sitting in one of the ·
leading cases interpreting the scope of the Act, United
States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941), Justice Frankfurter wrote the Court's opinion.
Justice Jackson in McGrath v. Christensen, 340 U. S.
162 ( 1950), participated in a case raising exactly the
same issue which he had decided as Attorney General (in
a way opposite to that in which the Court decided it).
340 U. S., at 176. Mr. Frank notes that Chief Justice
Vinson, who had been active in drafting and preparing
tax legislation while a member of the House of Representatives, never hesitated to sit in cases involving that
legislation when he was Chief Justice.
Two years before he was appointed Chief Justice of
this Court, Charles Evans Hughes wrote a book entitled
The Supreme Court of the United States (Colurnbia
University Press, 1928). In a chapter entitled "Liberty,
Property, and Social Justice" he discussed at some length

·'
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the doctrine expounded in the case of Adkins v. Children's Hospilal, 261 U.S. 525 (1922). I think that one
would be warranted in saying that he implied some
reservations about the holding of that case. See pp.
205, 209-211. Nino years later, Chief Justice Hughes
authored tho Court's opinion in West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 ( 1937), in which a closely divided
Court overruled A dlcins. I have never heard any suggestion that because of his discussion of the subject in
his book he should have recused himself.
Mr. Frank summarizes his view of Supreme Court
practice as to disqualification in the following words:
"In short, Supreme Court Justices disqualify when
they have a dollar interest; when they are related
to a party and more recently, when they are related
to counsel; and when the particular matter was in
one of their former law offices during their association; or, when in the government, they dealt with
the precise matter and particularly ·with the precise
case; otherwise, generally no." Frank, supra, 35
Law & Contemporary Problems, at 50.
Not only is the sort of public statement disqualification upon which respondents rely not covered by the
terms of the applicable statute, then, but it does not
appear to me to be supported by tho practice of previous
Justices of this Court. Since there is little controlling
authority on tho subject, and since under the existing
practice of the Court disqualification has been a matter
of individual decision, I suppose that one who felt very
strongly that public statement disqualification is a highly
desirable thing might find a way to road it into the
discretionary portion of the statute by implication. I
find little to commend tho concept on its merits, ho\\'ovor,
and I am, therefore, not disposed to construe the statutory language to embrace it.

·.
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I do not doubt that a litigant in the position of
respondents would much prefer to argue his case before a Court none of whose members had expressed
the views that I expressed about the relationship between surveillance and First Amendment rights while
serving as an Assistant Attorney General. I would
think it likewise true that counsel for Darby iYOuld
have preferred not to have to argue before Mr. Justice
Black; that counsel for Christensen would have preferred not to argue befon' Mr. Justice Jackson; 4 that
counsel for the United States would have preferred not
to argue before Mr. Justice Frankfurter; and that counsel
for \Vest Coast Hotel Co. would have preferred a Court
"·hich did not include Chief Justice Hughes.
The Term of this Court just past bears eloquent witness to the fact that the Justices of this Court, each
seeking to resolve close aml difficult questions of constitutional interpretation, do not reach identical results.
The differences must be at least in some part due to
differing jurisprudential or philosophical propensities.
Mn.. Jus'l'ICE DouGLAs' statement about federal district judges in his dissenting opinion in Chandler Y. Judicial Council, 398 U.S. 74, 137 (1970), strikes me as being
equally true of the Justices of this Court:
"Judges are not fungible; they cover the constitutional spectrum; and a particular judge's emphasis
may make a "·orld of difference when it comes to
rulings on evidence, the temper of the courtroom,
the tolerance for the profferred defense, and the
like. Lawyers recognize this when they talk about
4
The fact that Mr. Justice Jackson rcn'rsed his earlier opinion
n.ftcr sitting in Christensen doc~ not ~crm to nw to hr~1 r on 1 he
di~()ualificn. tion issue. A judge will u~naJJ~· hr required to mnkc
any decision as to dis()ualification before reaching any dctcrminnt ion
as to how he will vote if he doc.,; Fit.

71-288-1\fEi\10
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'shopping' for a judge; Senators recognize this when
they are asked to give their 'advice and consent'
to judicial appointments; laymen recognize this
when they appraise the quality and image of the
judiciary in their own community."
Since most Justices come to this bench no earlier than
their middle years, it would be unusual if they had not
by that time formulated at least some tentative notions
which would influence them in their interpretation of
the sweeping clauses of the Constitution and their interaction with one another. It would be not merely unusual, but extraordinary, if thev had not at least given
opinions as to constitutional issues in their previous
legal careers. Proof that a Jnstice's mind at the time
he joined the Court was R complete tabula rasa in the
area of constitutional acl .iuclicfltion would be evidence of
lack of quft lification, not lack of bias.
Yet whether these opinions ha.ve become at all widely
known m11v depend entirelv on happenstance. With respect to thoRe who come hf're clirectly from private life,
such comnwnts or opinions mav nr.ver have been publicly
uttered. "Rnt it would hf' unnsn:1l if those coming from
policv TYH,lrinq divisions in thP "F'.xecutive Branch, from
the Senptp nr Hom;e of Rf'nreRentatives, or from positions in f'lt"tA !!"overnment hacl not divulged at least somehint of thPi ... general annroach to public affairs, if 11ot
as to nftrtil'nlRr issues of law. Indeed, the clearest case
of all is th11t of a Justice who comes to this Court from
a lower conrt. and has, while sitting as a judge of the
lower court, had occasion to pass on an issue which later
comes before this Court. No more compelling example·
could be found of a situation in which a Justice had
previously committed himself. Yet it is not and could
not rationa.lly be suggested that, so long as the cases be·
different, a Justice of this Court should disqualify himself for that reason. See, e. g., the opinion of Mr. Jus-·
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tice Harlan, joining in Lewis v. Manufacturers National
Bank, 354 U. S. 503, 610 (1961).
Mr. Frank sums the matter up this way:
"Supreme Court Justices are strong minded men,
and on the general subject matters which come before them, they do have propensities; the course of
decision camJOt be accounted for in any other way."
Frank, supra, 30 Law & Contemporary Problems, at
48.
The fact that some aspect of these propensities may
have been publicly articulated prior to coming to this
Court cannot, in my opinion, be regarded as anything
more than a random circumstance which should not by
itself form a basis for disqualification."
Based upon the foregoing analysis, I conclude that
the applicable statute does not warrant my disqualification in this case. Having so said, I would certainly
concede that fair mindrd judges might disagree about the
matter. If all doubts were to be resolved in favor of disqualification, it may be that I should disqualify myself
simply because I do regard the question as a fairly debatable one, even though upon analysis I vvould resolve
it in favor of sitting.
Here again, one's course of action may well depend
upon the view he takes of the process of disqualification.
Those federal courts of appeals which have considered
the matter have unanimously concluded that a federal
judge has a duty to sit IYhere not disqual·ified w·hich is
5 In terms of propriet~·, rat her than di:;qualification , I would
distinguish quite shnrpl:-· hclwecn a public statement made prior
to nomination for the bench , on the one hand, and a public statement made by a nominee to the bench. For the latter to express
any but the most general obsen·ation about the law would sug~re~t that, in order to obtain favorable consiclcmtion of hi ~ nomination, he clelibcratelr was announcing in nd,·anre, without hrncfiL of
judicial oath, briefs, or argument, hO\Y he would deride a particular que:;t ion thal might rome before him as a judge.

.,

'·
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equally as strong as the duty to not sit where disqualified. Edwards v. United States, 334 F. 2d 360, 362
(CA5 1964); Tynan v. United States, 376 F. 2d 761
(CADC 1967); In re Union Leader Corporation, 292 F.
2d 3Sl (CAl 1961); Wolfson v. Palmieri, 396 F. 2d 121
(CA2 196S); Simmons v. United States, 302 F. 2d 71
(CA3 1962); United States v. Hoffa, 3S2 F. 2d S56
(CA6 1967); Tucker v. Kerner, 186 F. 2d 79 (CA7 1950);
Walker v. Bishop, 40S F. 2d 137S (CAS 1969). These
cases dealt with disqualification on the part of judges
of the district courts and of the courts of appeals. I think
that the policy in favor of the "equal duty" concept is
even stronger in the case of a Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States. There is no way of substiliuting Justices on this Court as one judge may be
substiliuted for another in the district courts. There is
no higher court of appeal which may review an equally
divided decision of this Court and thereby establish the
law for our jurisdiction. Sec, e.(]., 'Pinker v. Des Moines
School District, 25S F. Supp. 1971, affirmed by an
equally divided court, 3S3 F. 2d 9SS (CAS 1967), certiorari granted and judgment reversed, 393 U. S. 503
(1 969). While it can seldom be predicted with confidence ali the time that a Justice addresses himself to
the issue of disqualification whether or not the Court
in a particular case will be closely divided, the disqualification of one Justice of this Court raises the possibility
of au affirmance of the judgment below by an equally
divided Court. The consequence attending such a result
is, of course, that the principle of law presented by the
case is left unsettled. The undesirability of such a disposition is obviously not a reason for refusing to disqualify oneself where in fact one deems himself disqualified, but I believe it is a reason for not "bending over
backwards" in order to deem one's self disqualified.
The prospect of affirmance by an equally divided
Court, unsatisfactory enough in a single case, presents

71-288-MEMO
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even more serious problems where companion cases
reaching opposite results are heard together here. During the six months in which I have sat as a Justice of
this Court, there were at least three such instances.6
Since one of the stated reasons for granting certiorari
is to resolve a conflict among other federal courts or
state courts, the frequency of such instances is not
surpnsmg. Yet affirmance of each of such conflicting
results by an equally divided Court would lay down "one
rule in Athens, and another rule in Rome" with a vengeance. And since the notion of "public statement" disqualification which I understand respondents to advance
appears to have no ascertainable time limit, it is questionable when or if such an unsettled state of the law
could be resolved.
The oath prescribed by 28 U. S. C. ~ 453 which is
taken by each person upon becoming a member of the
federal judiciary requires that he "administer justice
without respect to persons, and do equal right to the
poor and to the rich," that he "faithfully and impartially
discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon
[him]. . . agreeably to the Constitution and la"·s of
the United States." Every litigant is entitled to have
his case heard by a judge mindful of this oath. But
neither tho oath, the disqualification statute, nor the·
practice of the former Justices of this Court guarantee
a litigant that each judge will start off from dead center
in his willingness or ability to reconcile the opposing
arguments of counsel with his understanding of the
Constitution and the law. That being the case, it is
not a ground for disqualification that a judge has prior
to his nomination expressed his then understanding
Branzburg v. I! ayes, In rc Pappas, and United States v. Caldwell,- U. S . - (1972). Gelba.rd v. United States and United
U. S. (1972). Airport Authority v. Delta
States v. Egan, Airlines Inc. and Northeast Airlines Inc. v. Aeronautics CommisU. S. (1972).
sion, -

'.

•.
I

.-

'

,.

6

,.
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of the meaning of some particular provision of the
Constitution.
Based on the foregoing considerations, I conclude that
respondents' motion that I disqualify myself in this
case should be, and it hereby is, deniecl. 7

7

Petitioners in Gravel v. United States, No. - , 0. T. 1971,
lun·e filed a petition for rchea ring whirh a~~erts a::: one of the
grounds that I should have disqualified my~elf in that case. Because respondents' motion in Laird w11s addressed to me, and
because it seemed to mo to be seriously and responsibly urged, I
have dealt with my reasons for denying it at some length. Because
I believe that the petition for rehearing in Gravel, insofar as it
deal:; with disqualification, possesses none of these characteristics,
there is no occasion for me to trea.t it in a similar manner. Since
such motions have in the past been treated by the Court as being
addressed to the individual Justice involved, however, I do venture
the observation that in my opinion the petition insofar as it relates
to disqualification verges on the fri \·olous. While my peripheral
advi~ory role in United States v. New York Timrs, U. S . ( 1971), would have warranted disqna lification had I been on the
Court when that case was heard, it. could not conceivably warrant
disqualifica,tion in Gravel, a different case raising entir-ely different
constilution::tl issues.

6/10/72--LAH
Rec

Laird v. Tatum, No. 71-288

Judge a
I have read Phil's recent memo to you regarding the
3d draft of Justice Burger's opinion in this case.

Since,

in the course of my research in Healy v. James, I have become
familiar with many of the recent First Amendment precedents
that are involved in this case, I would like to add a word
or two to his note.
First, Phil cites the NAACP v. Alabama case, the unanie
mous Harlan opinion on which we rely in Healy.

That case is

merely one important case in a longer string of precedent
establishing that there is most surely a cognizable First
Amendment interest in disclosing membership lists and
divulging associations.

See, e.g.,

Louisiana ex rel Gre-

million v. NAACPP 366 U.S. 293 (1961) (state law requiring
annual filing of list of officers and members of NAACP held
violative of 1st A.); Shelton v. Tucker, 364

u.s.

479 (1960)

(state law requiring teachers to file list of organizations
with which they are affiliated held unconstitutional);
v. City of Little Rock,

361

u.s.

Bates

516 (1960) (municipal ord-

inance requiring NAACP to file lists of members and contributors found unconstitutional•

This case is particular-

ly instructive because Justice Stewart noted that the
interference with First A. Rts was not direct or terribly
oppressive, but he concluded that "freedoms such as these are
protected not only against heavy-handed frontal attack,
but also from being stifled by more subtle governmental
interference."); Gibson v. Florida Investigating Committee,

--2-372 U.S. 539 (1963) (state investigating committee may not
inquire into membership lists of local branch of NAACP).
What all these cases seem to make unmistakably clear
is that there exists a rather well defined process of consti•
tutional adjudication under the First Amendment.

First, the

persons complaining of an infringement of protected first
amerldment interests must allege their injury.
is conceivable that

i~lll

While it

cases may arise in which the

alleged interference is so slight and so thoroughly insubstantial as to warrant summary disposition, those cases
are rare and this case is certainly not in that category.
Phil has stated the most significant point• in making this
threshold determination it makes absolutely no difference
whether the governmental intrusion is "legal" or "illegal"
in terms of whether there is constitutional or statutory
authorization for that interference.

Setting aside the

qeestion whether the interference is "legal," I am baffled
by the notion that these individuals did not state a
sufficient basis for raising a first amendment question.
All of the membership casesp as Phil points outp deal with
the prospect that some use will be made at some future time
of the mist of affiliations.

One needs not reflect very

deeply to conclude that the knowledge that one 0 s activities
are being monitored, and a file kept on his statements,
personal associations and affiliations may have a present
and direct inhibitory impact on free speech.
. +~Q..
.
1:..
h t h"~s 1"~t~gat~on
.
.
Th ~s
t he. po~nt
at W1"1~c
was short -

11

circuited in the DC, and the CA was right, in my view, to
have ordered the case returned to the DC.

Only then, having

--3-once established the existence of a first amendment interest,
may the case proceed to the 2d and 3d cinsiderations in
the traditional adjumicatory process.

Only then can a

court adequately determine whether there exists some
legitimate purpose for the governmental action.

l
J

And, if

such a legitimate purpose is found, only then can it be
determined whether the government's action is limited to
effecting the government 0 s inerest in the narrowest

/ manner, involving the least conflict with protected
speech.
The CJ gas confused these latter two points with the
question of threshold justiciability.

If the CA judgment

were affirmed I have little doubt that, ultimately, the
case would be won by the government.

Butv it would not

be won, and should not be won, on the ground that there is
no cognizable first amendment interest implicated by the
government surveillance scheme.

It could be won on the

ground that the government interest is substantial and
legitimate and it is circumscribed so that it is not
broadly intrusive into protected speech.

The case could

also be won by the government on the conclusion that the
case is now moot in light of the vast restrictions apparently
recently imposed on the government 0 s surveillance.
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CHAMBERS 01'"

JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

June 12, 1972

Re:

No. 71-288 - Laird v. Tatum

Dear Chief:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

..
The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

,juprtmr (!j.oltd ttf tlft '2!tnift~ ~tatc£J

'J!thtlilirfn.gtou,

p. QJ.

2!1[3)L$

CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICC HARRY A. BLACKMUN

June 12, 1972

Re:

No. 71-288

-

Laird v. Tatum.

Dear Chief:
Please join 1ne in your third draft recirculation of June 8.
Sincerely,

;I u.

'•

JJ.

.

The Chief Justice

cc:

The Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

September 27, 1972

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re :

No. 71-288 - Laird v. Tatum

There is presently pending before the Court a petition
for rehearing in this case, asserting inter alia that I
should have disqualified myself from participating. There
is also pending before me a separate motion of the respondents
in the case, addressed to me as an individual Justice,
requesting that I disqualify myself.
It is my present intention to file with the Clerk,
on the day on which the first Order List is released, the
attached Chambers opinion denying the motion of respondents
in this case addressed to me as an individual Justice. The
proposed Chambers opinion refers in a footnote on its last
page to the petition for rehearing in Gravel v. United States,
in which it is likewise asserted that I should have disqualified
myself.
In Gravel, however, no motion has been addressed to
me individually.

~·

W.H.R.
Att.
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lfp/xx 1cc Draft

Mr. Justice Powell, concurring:
I concur in the opinion of the Court and

su~p1it

thepe

~

__

~

additional views.

)

~~~)

~~ct~

~~

The central issue in this case is whether the BRJ!!xk Depart-

t-t-l

ment of Defense has the authority under the Constitution and

applicable law1 to collect and disseminate intelligence information
related to possible civil violence or disturbances. It may "88

eJR8ti'WR.

Ri'h~d

Respondents characterized the activity in question as

"surveillance of lawful and peaceful political activities. " Petitioners
refer to it

e'!'8~Q),;r

as domestic intelligence activity or •

the

"collection/ Jf civil B:it disturbance-related information. " I will
use the latter terminology, or variations of it, as it seems to
me more accurately to reflect the true nature of the activity.
But whatever it may be called, the essential facts - as reflected

2.
in the complaint, exhibits and affidavits - are not in dispute and
are summarized in Judge Willkie's opinion below.

:c.
It may help, nevertheless, to put this case in proper

perspect ive by identifying the role and responsibility of government
with respect to the problem involved.

The defendants in this case
•'

are the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, the
Chief of Staff of the Army, and the commanding general of the
U. S. Army Intelligence Command.

Although there is a good deal

case~ about the J:itary~

of rhetoric in this

its intrusions upon

~civilian

activities, the fact is that

a..c.~h.(
~~~~-...t
J........._...; ~

e responsib1 1

rest~

;

~

.........,t with any amorphous "the military"

or any specific members of the Armed Services.

Rather, it rests

explicitly under the Constitution and laws of this country upon the
)'

civilians who are appointed by the President, confirmed by the
Senate, and who oversee and are responsible for the Armed

Service~While it may well be thttt x subordinate military personnel
went beyond the intendment of their civilian bosses in some of the

..

3.
activities here involved

i

~aR:a

t8Q. Rff!:elit'\1 its in !he

there has been no showing whatever of

ea,tiHil

res~eftsi:ble

se iB8ieate1,

military authorities

attempt ing to circumvent or frustrate the traditional s civilian
control over the Armed Services of the United States. lft moy :k

~the inferences and arguments to the contrary are quite

u without support. Nor is the resolution of the issu¥ here
,..,.~~
f .Hl¥elv9d. aided by attempting to place this case in the posture of
1\
e-.~~

beiR:g

lit

e8fth 8¥6! sy,.. between military and civilian control or as

involving any conceivable threat of military usurpation.

We have

~

been blessed in this country, throug\its~ history, with
a<-c•~•<Q

unswerving ¥Pee8oe88~g;tl'!ntt·:t~iol"Jll'l!T'i"t'07ff"'1tl1'ltrf!e!""'ee-o01tmtc~e8olfiL:~,{of complete subordination
of the military to the civil government and authorities. If there
has been unlawful conduct in this case the responsibility lies as they would be the first to acknowledge - with the Secretary
of Defense and the Secretary of the Army.
The Department of the Army operates under general
directives from the Department of Defense with respect to

4.
intelligence activities within the United States.

They pertain

~e Bf'eaa areas:
A

(i) Personnel security investigations, for the purpose
of determining whether civilian and military employees of the
Army and employees of defense contractors can be granted access
to classified information;
(ii) Special investigations pertaining to l!8yHsliy

8sR8

espionageJ~Pt," e~.~~{iian"'fnct military employees
of the Army; and
(iii) The gathering of information concerning activities
which may affect the mission or security of the Army if called
upon to deal with civil disturbances which are beyond the capability
of state and local authorities to control. *
*See affidavit of Thaddeus R. Beal, Under Secretary of the Army,
Appendix 69; letter of Robert E. Jordan, Ill, general counsel
to the Army, dated February 26, 1970, filed with respondent's
affidavits, Appendix 51-55.

5.
a-c..~~~
These intelligence f~, most :X of which have been conducted
•

~ ~"""'

for many years, are carried out by approximately 1, 000 agents
assigned to the_3ntelligence

"'

~ommand by the

Department of the

Army. In a document filed on behalf of respondents, it is stated
~

that "94% of the time" of these agents ilK devoted to 88n:8ll&tiag
"security investigations to determine whether uniform members
of the army, civilian employees and contractors' employees
should be granted access to classified information. "*
This suggests that only

» about

6% of the time of this unit was

~~
devoted to the other intelligence missions, including counter:mtecxx intelligence with respect to "loyalty and espionage matters"

.

~.

d~Eie>l's.

Translating these percentages of time into

personnel, it appears that on the average there were about 60
*See Appendix A to Speiser affidavit, letter of Robert 1IExxH
Jurdan, general counsel to the Department of the Army, dated
Feb. 26, 1970, Appendix 51, 52.

6.

"agents" devoting a part of their time to the questioned activity.
This would mean :muvqm: 1. 2 agents per state for the 50 states. *

4J....J....CL

The type of surveillance activities
The

R~

~ \~'"'~~.

alleged,. merit~~·

complaint states that the information was acquired

by "defendants' agents' surveillance of lawful and peaceful
political activities, by anonymous informants, and through the
use of photographic and electronic equipment. Other information
. . . was obtained from local and state police departments and
from the Federal Bureau of Investigation. " **

*It is recognized, of course, that averages can be deceptive
and no doubt in certain major cities, and at particular times,
the efforts: devoted to this type of information gathering was
substantially greater. Nevertheless, the~ quantative
effort could hardly be characterized as "massive". Cf.
dissenting of Mr. Justice Douglas, infra p.
.
**Complaint, ~8. It is interesting, if not unusual, that the
factual allegations of the complaint are stated to be based upon
a magazine article: "The information contained in the foregoing

7.
The reference to "electronic equipment" apparently was
t o the use of taperecorders and similar devices at public rallies
and meetings.

There is no allegation in the complaint of the

use of elect ronic surveillance (wiretapping and bugging) proscribed
by Title III of the Omnibus Crime Act of 1968, which would have
been unlawful without a prior court order. Both of the courts

~~~.;~~~~~

below found

tha~ tl~.Q

tyJi'Q4UKfor;g;.laU.QR i8H88i8~ required no

I-1.A.. ~~ . ~ ~ -~ J. ;_~'1
unlawful techniques, as li~ available to the public generally.
The District Court found:
" . . . the army is keeping the type of information
that is available to all news media in this country,
covered by all news media in this country and which
is in the morgues ilx of the newspapers of this
country and magazines . . . " Appendix 126.
((

..... This finding of the trial judge was confirmed by the

majority opinion of the Court of Appeals as follows:

J
"There is no evidence of illegal' unlawful
surveillance activities. We arel~ited to any
clandestined intrusion by a military agent.
So far as it yet shown, the information gathered
is nothing more than a good newspaper reporter
would be able to gather by attendance at public
meetings and the clippings of articles from
publications available on any news stand."*
*Tatum v. Laird, 444 F. 2d 947/

8.
The method by which the information was disseminated
within the Army corroborates these findings.

Exhibit A to the

complaint purports to be a copy of the intelligence unit's "weekly
intelligence summary", addressed to its commanding officer
but showing information copies to a number of military commands.
The document is not classified, which means that it contained
neither secret, confidential nor restricted material. It could
have been delivered to any news reporter, and indeed the summary
of "events" in this report could have been compiled largely from
the daily press without attendance by agents at any of the meetings.
The "system", as it is called by respondents, may have
been a clumsy and unproductive effort.

But obviously no one tried

to conceal it. Indeed, the truth probably is that the surveillance
.,4-0

activity was so "low level" and - as it turned out -) relatively
inconsequential, it did not come to the attention of the responsible
military and civilian authorities.

They were of course aware

of the over-all intelligence mission, which inherently was an

9.
important one. But, as the action taken following the filing of the
complaint indicate, those in authority just did not know how ineptly
this element of the intelligence mission was being conducted.
II

But whatever may be said about the essential amateurishness
of the operation) t is necessary - if this case is to be kept in focus to bear in mind (i) the relatively limited scope d what "the military"
actually did, and (ii) the openness with which it was done.

The

question for decision, against this background, is whether the
Department of Defense allowed this sytem to function in a way which
infringed constitutional rights.

I concur in the opinion of the Court
~

that the complaint and affidavits submitted below do not show such
an infringement.
Respondents' position, essentially, is that the activity
here challenged is unlawful altogether.

The complainf avers

that the information collected "serves no legitimate military
J!ljJx: purpose"; it further avers that "the establishment and

"

..

10.

administration by the defendants and their agents of the
intelligence program described above, exceeds the lawful needs
and authority of the United states Army and is without any lawful

~

;#.~

statutory authority. " aAdfue relief sought isj that the system
"is unconstitutional" and should be :mpl:x permanently enjoined.
~~~~~)
In oral argumen~ counsel for respondents stated that the complaint and affidavits "portray a system that we believe can only
be considered disgraceful in the United states of America . .

"*

In respondents' brief, it is repeatedly stated that the Department
of the Army has no constitutional power to conduct surveillance
of domestic political activities.
flatly asserts that "the statutes

Moreoever, respondents' brief

[io U.S. C.

§§

331-334, relied

upon by the governmeriJ empower the military to act only~
a particular insurrection has grown beyond the
capabilities of the civilian police. . . . **
*Appendix 12 5.
**Respondents' Brief p. 68.

~
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11.
'

The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas, as Imx

'

read it, agrees with respondent that "military surveillance
over civilian affairs" is not authorized by law. Indeed,
.

~/-c4M~I/~~
~draws

~

·~

1\

a distinction between the "militia" and

the Armed Forces and appears to conclude that (with the possible exception

{he Al:med

;.

off'~tate of ~ "martial law')ie Q.sela:rs8,

~·~~ responsibility or authority~ a~~

/.

'1-~~~

A respect to internal disorders or insurrections.
With all respect, I disagree.

The authority, indeed, the

~

constitutional duty, of the Armed til8Fvj"fis is summarized in
a letter of August 16, 1967, addressed by then Attorney General
'·'

Ramsey Clark to the Governors of all of the states as follows:
"At the President's request, I am writing
you regarding the legal requirements for the use
of Federal troops in case of severe domestic
violence within your state. The requirements are
simple. They arise from the Constitution. So
the principles will be clearly in mind, I will briefly
outline here the basic considerations of Federal
law applicable to such a situation.
~

"The underlying constitutional authority is
the duty of the United States under Article IV,
Sec. 4, to protect each of the states 'on Application of the Legislature, or the Executive) when

'

12.
the Legislature cannot be convened) against
domestic Violence. ' This pledge is implemented
by Chapter 15 of Title 10, U.S. C. and particularly
10 U. S.C. 331, which derives from an act of
Congress passed in 1792. The history of the use
of Federal forces at the request of governors in
varied circumstances of local violence over more
than a century is also instructive. "*
Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution obligates the federal

-

government to "guarantee to every state in this union a
republican
form of government" and to protect each state
.
[upon request of the Legislature or Executive (~gainst domestic
"!;>.
·-333
violence." Sectio~ 331~ of Title 10 U.S. C. implementl this

obligation,by

:!J;,.t;:;;{tfJ =~~
)\

)

federalize the national guard of "other states'and to "use such
of the /rmed j orces as he considers necessari to suppress

Nwi insurrections·.

,,

-

It is of course truefPrespondents assert, that there

*Appendix 109.

13.
is no express statutory authorization to collect intelligence
information on actual or potential sources or leaders of domestic
violence or disorder.

The five essMtttal functions of military

staff work traditionally have been operations, intelligence,
personnel, logistics and supplyJand planning.

express statutory authorization for

There is no

the,J'"med~ in

~
preparation for a possible call to discharge .US constitutional
duty, to engage in any of these essential military functions.
~

Yef:;:A! w~•H bm & th€Might teat the need for advance contigency
A.

planning and preparation - involving all of the five traditional
~

functions of military readiness and operations -

~e

necessarily

implied in the basic authority. Otherwise the authority itself
would be meaningless1] The Court of Appeals
recognized the "military

need~

e~llQssly

[for] certain intelligence

information to perform their mission 'to enforce the laws of
the United States' or 'suppress . . . insurrection. '" In
amplifying this view, the majority opinion below said:

~

,

14.
''In performing this type function the Army
is essentially a police force or the back-up of a
local police force. To quell disturbances or to
prevent further disturbances the Army needs the
same tools and, most importantly, the same
information to which local police forces have access.
Since the Army is sent into territory almost
invariably unfamiliar to most soliders and their
commanders, their need for information is likely
to be greater than that of the hometown policeman.
"No logical argument can be made for compelling the military to use blind force. When force
is employed it should be intelligently directed, and
this depends upon having reliable informationin time . . . . " 444 F. 2d 947,
There can be no question as to the authority of the Army,
or as to its duty, to prepare for its possible role in the event
of serious domestic disorders by obtaining intelligence on the

.

.

probable leadership of such disorders, the time and place, and
the forces and techniques likely to be used.

Without reliable
.·'

information on these essential elements of information, the
necessary contingency plans could not be developed.

Indeed,
•:'

the obtaining of accurate intelligence could forestall an overreaction or the employment of force when none was needed.
The affidavits considered by the courts below abundantly
document the need for this type of intelligence information during

,·

15.
the period primarily in question.

Although the activity complained

of began modestly in the summer of 1965, the possibility of serious

'

-'

..

and escalating civil disorder became a matter of high level concern
following the Detroit rioting in July, 1967. This had been
contained only after federal troopos were called into action at the
request of the Governor of Michigan. *
Following the Detroit disorders, then Secretary of Defense

~:.

Robert McNamara created a special high level civil disturbance
task force under the direction of the Under Secretary of the Army.
This task force, which included both military and

1X

civilian

personnel, was assigned the responsibility of developing
contingency plans and preparations, including the obtaining of
necessary intelligence, for the possible need of further federal
troop intervention at the request of a state.
*Although federal troops had been used in connection with
desegregation problems and the enforcement of federal court
orders in Little Rock and elsewhere, such troops had not been
used to assist local authorities in dealing with domestic disorder
since 1943 when rioting in Detroit prompted the then Governor
of Michigan to request federal assistance. Appendix 87.

.·"'

'

16.
The wisdom, certainly for the short term, of establishing
such a task force and of embarking upon the necessary planning,
was demonstrated by the tragic events in April 1968, commencing
with the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

The

affidavit of then Deputy Attorney General Warren Christopher
summarizes the role of the Department of Justice and the Army
in dealing, cooperatively, with the serious civil disturbances
.,

which errupted in Washington, requiring activation and deployment
of federal troops.* When viewed today in the relatively tranquility
the
of 1972, the need for such intervention of federal troops iry'future
may seem remote.

Yet, we have witnessed in

R

recent years

unprecedented civil disorders and violence, with no one able
to predict the extent to which it might assume epidemic
proportions with grave threats to the domestic stability of
'

the country.

.

The majority opinion of the Court of Appeals

pointed out that:
·'·.

*Appendix 103.
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"During the period 1967-1968 the national guard
was called upon 83 times and the army four times
to quell cases of civil disorder. " 444 F. 2d 947, _ . *
In view of these circumstances the government would have

...

.;,

,,

been irresponsible indeed not to have taken all necessary precautions
a

to assure that, when called upon by/state, the army would have
the capability of protecting the lives and property of our citizens.
It had been demonstrated that civilian authorities alone, including

the FBI and all available state forces, were inadequate to deal
with the type of domestic violence which had profoundly shocked
*According to one unofficial news report, in the month of April
1968 alone there were 237 civil disorders, 27, 000 arrests, 43
deaths, over 58 million dollars in property damage, and over
58, 000 federal troops were employed to quell civil disturbances.
U.S. News & World Report, Sept. 2, 1968, p. 68. Many of
these disorders were relatively minor, but no one could be
sure in the period 1965-1970 whether the major outbreaks of
violence in Watts, Chicago, Newark, Detroit and Washington
were episodic or indicative of an escalating trend.

17.
the country.
No challenge was advanced in those darker days against
the authority of the Defense Department to take appropriate
measures.

But the authority plainly derives from the Constitution

itself and by necessary inference from the statutes above cited.
I conclude that the Army, under the direction and control of the
duly designated civilian authorities, was authorized by law to
conduct domestic intelligence gathering activities.

Since

respondents attack the validity of the system itself, and deny

~~~
\

~

tha~hority exists,

·~'il.c.
{conclude that they are not entitled

to the injunctive relief which they seek.

;

,/

'!

.•

..
,,J,

.~

Nor do I find a basis in the complaint for less sweeping
relief than that desired against the entire system.
specific allegation of unlawful conduct.

There is no

The averments of the

complaint are limited to the following specifics: (i) the
surveillance of lawful and peaceful political activities by Army
agents who attend public meetings; (ii) the obtaining of information
on political activities through anonymous informants; (iii) the
obtaining of such information at public meetings through the use
of photographic and electronic recording equipment, and from
the files of the civilian police; (iv) the regular dissemination of
this information on an unclassified basis; (v) the publication of
a "blacklist", "believed to be an encyclopedia of profiles of
individuals . . . who, in the opinion of its compilers, might
(VJ)

cause trouble for the :x Army;" and the storing of information
1\

about political activities in data banks.

These are the only hard

averments in a complaint which is otherwise wholly conculsatory.

~

in itself.

Yet, none of these alleged activities is unlawful

As the Circuit Court of Appeals found: "There is no

evidence of illegal or unlawful
The essence of

KBX

surveillance activities. "

~

respondents' position is

that the totality of these lawful acts results in a'chilling" of
speech and associational rights protected by the First Amendment.
Again no specific instances of chilling - and certainly none of
()A.A...

outright infringement -

.i,s.

averred.

The documents accompanying

A

the complaint show that respondents attended public meetings and
continued to pursue their lawful political activities. We may
surmise that some persons were deterred from attending meetings
because of a reluctance to be photographed, 1:ElreK tape recorded
or listed as having attended.

This, however, is an inevitable

risk of a free and open society. Anyone - whether private
citizen, news reporter, policeman or government representative is IE rfectly free to photograph public gatherings, to list the
names of persons in attendance and to maintain "morgues" or

'' • .

other records thereof.
political mill.

This is the daily grist of the American

The truth is that few participants in political

meetings, rallies or demonstrations desire privacy. One of the

"i

~ ~~::s
purposes is to attract publicity, stimulate interest, and carry
1\

"

the "message" ta:tkx through the media and other publicity to an

~

audience far wider than the immediate participants. Moreover,
for one to develop position or stature as a leader in a protest
movement or a "cause" of any kind, publicity is essential,.
'J.v_~q.JZ ~_, (.;f

,\ is avidly sought and if

publicity were denied by state action,

there would iH!hl!d be a constitutional issue.

;$-u.:;l'
~A the

~

complaint in this case avers no violation of

;

/

law, and asserts no cause of action cognizable in the courts.

It is well to remember that all grievances cannot be

resolved by the judiciary. This case involves essentially a
'·'

political problem. It can and is being addressed by the political
branches of government. We know from the affidavits and

'

2./

documents filed that the BB: Department of Defense and the
Department of the Army already have acted substantially to
RHXiiadxl curtail, if not entirely to discontinue, the activities

described in this complaint. Indeed, if the case were remanded
it would probably be deemed mooted by this action.
In addition, one or more Committees of the Congress
are conducting extensive investigations to determine whether
~

and to what extent the information gathering activities of the
1\
Armed Forces should be curtailed or regulated by legislation.
The political branches of government are far better equipped
to deal wisely with this problem and to provide such future
monitoring of these activities as may be requisite.
In concluding, I add a personal w:r>rd: My conclusion
that the complaint fails to state a cause of action justiciable
in the <X courts implies no approval of the challenged conduct.
For the reasons stated above, the Armed Services have the

.

•.

'

.

authority and the duty - acting pursuant to civilian control and
direction - to collect sufficient intelligence information to enable

{-o~~
them to anticipate possible cabsA to prepare contingency plans

'.
,,(

'·'

therefor, and to be able to act when necessary with efficiency
and minimum force.
,. '

Having said this, it is reasonably clear that the Army in
~

discharging this duty acted neither with restraint nor appropriate

......

"

wisdom.

There is an abhorrence among a free people to the

presence at lawful meetings of government agents, however
,,.

innocuous their presence may be.

Similarly, there is under-

standable resentment when the agents record names and faces)
even though the
to do likewise.

media~nd

anyone else present is p9PfeeM:y free

Finally, as the

information~

,,.

collected

by the Army under the questioned "system" was readily available
from other sources, it was little short of foolhearty for Army

.,

agents to conduct this amateurish operation.

.-

Although the case is not one for the courts, the bringing
of the suit may well have accomplished its purpose. This type
of information gathering is not likely to occur again.

